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ABSTRACT 
The basic aim of this thesis is to investigate unemployment in Australia 
using a disequilibrium framework. In particular, involuntary unemployment is 
examined from both a Keynesian and a Classical perspective. As a consequence, 
both Classical and Keynesian doctrines were interpreted as disequilibrium theories 
called Neo-Classical and (New) Keynesian respectively. Examined within a (New) 
Keynesian (disequilibrium) theory an unambiguous definition of involuntary 
unemployment emerges. The Neo-Classical (disequilibrium) theory, unlike the 
Classical theory, also allows for bouts of involuntary unemployment. 
Consequently, a distinction between Neo-Classical and (New) Keynesian 
involuntary unemployment is considered a matter of degree rather than principle; if 
wages adjust more rapidly than employment toward equilibrium, then 
unemployment would be Neo-Classical. Furthermore, since involuntary 
unemployment is a disequilibrium concept, the unemployment model was 
estimated using a disequilibrium procedure. After reviewing the econometrics and 
theory of disequilibrium a generalized partial adjustment equation, developed by 
Chow (1983), was adopted. This procedure has distinct advantages over other 
techniques. The unemployment model was estimated for Australia over two 
periods: 1964 to 1972 for the first period and from 1972 to 1986 for the second 
period. It was found that neither period could be classified as either pure (New) 
Keynesian or Neo-Classical; however, there is evidence of elements of both 
theories in each period. This thesis also examined structural and search 
unemployment. Finally, evidence of labour dishoarding in period two was also 
found. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 .1 AUSTRALIA'S UNEMPLOYMENT: AN OVERVIEW 
1 .1 .1 Extent of Australia's IlneniDlovment 
Observation of graph 1.1 indicates that unemployment in Australia has shown an 
upward trend since the 1960s, particularly after 1974. Registered unemployment peaked 
in 1983 at 10.7 per cent of the workforce (February), and has now settled at around the 8 
per cent level. Over this time span two periods are worthy of special attention: 1974 
(November) to 1978 (February) during which unemployment rates accelerated from 3.7 
per cent to 7.5 per cent respectively and 1981 (February) to 1983 (February) in which 
unemployment rates rose from 6.3 per cent to 10.7 per cent. 
Since peaking in 1985, the registered unemployment rate has settled at around the 
8 per cent level. The labour market, however, has issued some confused signals over the 
significance of this level. A rate of 8 per cent, given post-war history, would seem 
abnormally high and indicative of depressed demand; however, Sloan (1985) and others 
are now speaking of 7 per cent unemployment as the true full employment level. 
From an international perspective, Australia's unemployment rates have 
deteriorated over this period relative to the average unemployment rates for OECD 
countries. Whilst Australia was consistently below the OECD average before 1975, it 
has been, in general, consistently near or above the OECD average since 1975. This can 
be seen from Graph 1.2. 
1 .1 .2 Dimensions nf Ilnemnlovment 
Traditionally as unemployment rises (a downturn in the trade-cycle), persons who 
are able to work may become discouraged and stop looking for work. Married women, 
for example, may stop searching for a job and stay at home. In other words participation 
rates and economic activity are, in general, positively related. Two implications are; 
that (i) employment and unemployment are not exact opposites and therefore 
GRAPH 1.1 
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Table 1.1: Labour Force Linemplovment Rates (a) for 
Selected OECD Countries 
1972-1986 
(Per cent) 
Year(b) Australia USA Canada Japan France Germany Italy Sweden UK 
1972 2.6 5.6 6.2 1.4 2.8 0.7 3.4 2.7 4.2 
1973 2.3 4.9 5.5 1.3 2.7 0.7 3.2 2.5 3.2 
1974 2.7 5.6 5.3 1.4 2.9 1.6 2.8 2.0 3.1 
1975 4.8 8.3 6.9 1.9 4.0 3.6 5.8 1.6 4.3 • 
1976 4.7 7.6 7.1 2.0 4.4 3.7 6.6 1.6 5.7 
1977 5.6 6.9 8.0 2.0 4.9 3.6 7.0 1.8 6.1 
1978 6.2 6.0 8.3 2.2 5.2 3.5 7.1 2.2 6.0 
1979 6.2 5.8 7.4 2.1 5.9 3.2 7.6 2.1 5.1 
1980 6.0 7.0 7.4 2.0 6.3 3.0 7.5 2.0 6.6 
1981 5.7 7.5 7.5 2.2 7.3 4.4 8.3 2.5 9.9 
1982 7.1 9.5 10.9 2.4 8.1 6.1 9.0 3.1 11.4 
1983 9.9 9.5 . 11.8 2.6 8.3 8.0 9.8 3.5 12.6 
1984 8.9 7.4 11.2 2.7 9.7 8.5 10.2 3.1 13.0 
1985 8.2 7.1 10.4 2.6 10.1 8.6 10.5 2.8 13.2 
1986 7.9 7.0 9.7 2.6 10.0 8.4 10.9 2.8 13.1 
Source: Labour Statistics, AustraUa; 1972/74, 1982 p.l34; 1975/85, 1985 p.l42 
OECD Main Economic Indicators, 1986. p. 18 
Graph 1.2: Comparative Unemplovment Rates 
Constructed from above table 
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one cannot equate an increase in unemployment with a reduction in employment, and (ii) 
that the discouraged worker effect reduces the labour supply. Varying participation rates, 
independent of economic activity, may provide, in part, an exogeneous explanation of the 
variation of the unemployment rate. Unemployment rates may therefore be higher than 
official data will suggest. 
Gregory (1984) argues that the traditional relationship between economic activity 
and the participation rate had not always held in Australia during the seventies. He states: 
"during the seventies the rate at which people entered and left the labour force in response 
to job opportunities became more volatile. The large increase in [registered] 
unemployment during 1974-75, for example, now seems to be not so much due to the 
rate of job loss, that was exceptional for a recession, but to the exceptional behaviour of 
the labour force participation rate. When faced with deteriorating job prospects during 
1974, workers did not leave the labour force at the same rate as in earlier recessions. 
Consequently, [registered] unemployment increased more quickly by a larger amount" 
(Gregory 1984, pl3-14). A similar experience occurred in 1979. This phenomenon has 
been illustrated in the Gregory and Duncan (1979) thesis, where they compared 
withdrawal and entry to the labour force in the 1951 recession with the 1974-75 recession 
(Gregory 1984, pl3-14). As well as a change in the level of the participation rate, there 
has also been a change in the composition of the participation rate. Table 1.2 highlights 
this development. 
The proportion of the total labour force comprised of married females has 
increased consistently since the 1960s. As Mitchell (1984, p5) points out: "Australia's 
labour force exhibits two characteristics found in other English-speaking countries: 
declining male participation rates and rising female participation rates". 
According to Mangan and Stokes (1984, p40,41), available data suggest that 
females and particularly married females dominate the stock of discouraged workers. 
Moreover, the discouraged female worker is likely to be aged over 25 years. To be 
registered as unemployed, a person must be actively seeking employment. 
TABLE 1.2: Labour Force Participation Rates» 
Year at 
August Males All Females Married Females Persons 
1966 84.0 36.3 29.0 59.9 
1973 82.1 41.4 39.0 61.6 
1982 76.6 43.9 42.1 60.1 
1986 75.9 43.7 43.1 60.1 
Absolute 
change from 
1966-86 -8.1 +7.4 +14.1 +0.2 
X Defined as the percentage ratio of the labour force to the population aged 15 years and over. 
Source: The Labour Force Australia, ABS, Catalogue No. 6203 
Discouraged workers are often referred to as hidden unemployment. "At August 1979 a 
total of 373,800 persons were registered unemployed, while Strieker and Sheehan (1981) 
estimate that a further 353,000 persons were hidden unemployed" (Mangan and Stokes, 
1984, p38). More recent figures, according to Mangan and Stokes (1984, p23), indicate 
that "close to one million persons or 15 per cent of the total labour force (at May 1982)", 
would have been unemployed, if all dimensions of unemployment had been considered. 
It can therefore be seen that participation rates exert an influence on the 
unemployment rate. The discouraged worker effect, if not considered, may lead to 
significant underestimation of unemployment levels. This is indicative of segmentation in 
the labour market. Whitfield (1986, pi 19-122), has cited a number of studies which 
identify significant areas of segmentation and disadvantaged groups for the Australian 
labour market. Moreover, Watkins (1986, pi4-15) cites a number of authors who argue 
"that the jobs into which students enter are divided into institutionally and technologically 
discrete segments. Such a phenomenon has been noted in Australia by Gilmour and 
Landsbury (1978)... On a broader scale, Windschuttle (1979) argues that the trend in 
Australia is toward a segmented labour market." 
1.1.3 Qf Un̂ mplQYffî nt 
Since the 1960s three groups exhibited above-average unemployment rates; 
females, older males and teenagers. Whilst registered unemployment rates for females 
have approached equality with those of males at around 8 per cent in 1987, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that females suffer disproportionately high rates of 
hidden unemployment and underemployment. Underemployment is where workers 
receive fewer hours than they desire. It is perhaps to be expected that females, 
particularly married females, would feature prominently in hidden unemployment, as 
unemployed married females have no monetary incentive to register as unemployed. 
Merrilees (1982a) has shown that, of the total number listed in the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) surveys of discouraged workers, over 75 per cent on average are 
females. The occupational distribution of women, resulting from both demand and 
supply side factors, with its high incidence of part-time work, makes underemployment 
an inevitable problem. Analysis of A.B.S data on involuntary short-time working shows 
that teenage females are the group most affected by underemployment (Mangan and 
Stokes 1984, p43, 45). 
Older males and older persons in general do not have overly high registered 
unemployment rates, but there is considerable evidence of hidden unemployment 
amongst older males. Merrilees (1982b) has documented the "exodus from the 
workforce" that occurred in the early 1980s amongst older males. Whether this exodus 
was caused by the discouraged worker effect, or induced on the supply side by pensions 
and other social welfare payments, is in dispute. What is unquestioned however, is that 
if all those older males who left the workforce prematurely returned, the registered 
unemployment rate for older males would be much higher. 
Strieker and Sheehan (1978, pl5) have shown that the teenage rate of registered 
unemployment has often been relatively high: "Even as far back as 1954, the rate of 
unemployment for teenagers was 1.7 times that of adults". There are a number of 
reasons for this connected with both demand and supply aspects. On the supply side, 
teenagers, particularly early school leavers, have little formal human capital and little or 
no work experience. In addition, the reduction in employment opportunities in 
manufacturing during the 1970's restricted the traditional ports of entry for unskilled 
youth. There is also evidence that employees are substituting married females for youth, 
which may in part be due to the traditional job search behaviour of youth, and its 
consequent effect on labour turnover. Rice (1986) in her work on juvenile 
unemployment in Britain, found that failure to achieve initial entry into the labour market 
was a serious problem for young school leavers and one which disadvantaged them in the 
long term. Miller and Volker (1987) have also found similar evidence for Australia. 
1 .2 THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
1 . 2 . 1 Social Costs of Unemplovment 
An enormous amount of literature exists today on unemployment which contains 
various views on causes and policy prescriptions. Often many papers assume its 
importance. This section will briefly demonstrate, not assume, that unemployment does 
matter and any investigation that may shed light on its causes and cures is worth 
pursuing. In both social and economic dimensions unemployment is a problem. 
As Tomlinson (1983, p45) points out, the link between unemployment and 
poverty was perhaps first subject to rigorous study by Rowntree in England in 1936. He 
states: "that 1930's unemployment was the major cause of poverty and was shown in 
Rowntree's study of York in 1936 and the New Survey of London in the early 1930's". 
According to Smith (1984), unemployment is perhaps the major factor contributing to the 
numbers placed in poverty. There are further social ramifications of unemployment on 
the physical and mental health of those unemployed. 
Smith (1984, pl25), citing a 1975 study by the Victorian Mental Health 
Authority, "showed that the rate of attempted suicide among the unemployed (in Ballarat) 
was more than twelve times the average area rate". In the Blacktown area of New South 
Wales the salient feature of those attempting suicide was unemployment. A recent paper 
presented to the University of Wollongong by Ahlburg (1984) reflects similar findings. 
Ahlburg (1984, plO), citing a study by Martina (1984) of the Australian National 
University, reported a "positive association between unemployment and suicide rates for 
males 15-29 years with males 20-24 most sensitive to unemployment [and]....found a 
positive correlation between the unemployment rate and the percentage of male deaths 
attributable to suicide for the period 1966-1980 (significant at the .05 level)". Ahlburg 
(1984, p3) further cites a study conducted in conjuction with Schapiro (1982-83); they 
"found that a one per cent increase in the United States unemployment rate in 1980 led to 
an additional 320 suicides". It has been assumed thus far that despair is a consequence of 
being unemployed for long periods. Viney (1984) in her article 'The Psychological and 
Social Effects of Unemployment', however, cites numerous studies linking many 
adverse psychological states with unemployment. Many of these studies linked 
unemployment with various states of anxiety, such as shame, guilt, loneliness, 
helplessness and depression; as Viney (1984, pi35) states, the "most important of all, 
and that which many underlie all these other [states], is alienation." 
In respect to physical health Smith (1984) states that "the deterioration of diet 
(through poverty) combined with general depression means that some unemployed and 
their children are particularly prone to illness. A study undertaken in Birmingham 
indicated that parental unemployment doubled the risk of a child's admission to hospital 
(generally with an infectious disease). Brunn and Drane at Macquarie University also 
showed a strong association between ischaemic heart disease, mortality and 
unemployment" (Smith, 1984, pl25). 
The reader should, however, be aware of the tenuous statistical links between 
unemployment, health and poverty. Both Tomlinson (1983) and Ahlburg (1984) address 
the writings of Ian Stem. Tomlinson (1983, p36), in citing Stem (1981), writes: "the 
inter-relationship between the incidence of poverty, unemployment, low eamings, high 
mortality and high morbidity rates makes it very difficult to disentangle the effect of 
unemployment from the effects of other variables on morbidity and mortality rates." 
Ahlburg (1984, p3) also writes: "Stem (1983) has recently argued 'that there is no 
reliable evidence, as yet, in favour of the view that unemployment is the major 
determinant of morbidity and/or mortality', since it is not possible to establish the 
direction of causality. In fact [Stem (1983)] argues that the incidence of ill-health and 
unemployment are both strongly affected by [other] underlying socio-economic factors." 
As demonstrated in the previous section, however, unemployment does not fall 
proportionately on those in the labour market. Those who are in disadvantaged or weak 
positions in the labour market are more prone to be unemployed. Thus, as Tomlinson 
(1983, p36) points out, unemployment "may serve to reinforce as much as cause a 
pattem of low income" and ill-health. 
Another problem of being unemployed is, as Tomlinson (1983) argues, the de-
politicisation of those persons out of work, as it deprives them of the resources, such as 
unions, income and knowledge, which are a necessary pre-condition for political activity. 
The de-politicisation, coupled with the alienation of the unemployed, may damage social 
and political order. Dwyer and Wilson (1981) "found evidence of increased social 
tension among the unemployed inner city youth" (in Ahlburg, 1984, plO). Tomlinson 
(1983) cites Hitler's rise to power in Germany when the level of mass unemployment 
(30%) was on a scale never experienced by Britain. Tomlinson (1983) points out, 
however, quite rightly, that Hitler's rise to power was due to many other important 
factors. This paper does not wish to overstate the social and political dissent caused by 
unemployment, but merely wishes to make the point that perhaps other subtle social 
changes are underfoot. 
Indeed the increase in crime associated with increased unemployment is a 
manifestation of anti-social behaviour. Ahlburg (1984, plO), citing the Yearbook of 
Australia (1983), found that a parallel rise in crime occurred over the period 1971-72 to 
1980-81, "even though the prime crime group (males 15-24 years) remained relatively 
constant at about 9 per cent of the population over this period." Smith (1984, pi26) 
states that "perhaps one of the most significant research studies was that done by the 
South Australian Working Party into Unemployment (May, 1976) which showed the 
percentage increase for several classes of offenders in the period June 1973-76". 
TABLE 1.3 Percentage Increase in Crime by Class 
Age 14 to 18 Increase 
Total offenders 58% 
School-attending offenders 40% (approx.) 
Workforce employed offenders 37% 
Workforce unemployed offenders 238% 
Source: Smith, P. (1984, pl26). 
Heeding Stem's point about causality, this paper does not wish to overstate the 
causation between unemployment and criminalization. Indeed, increasing crime could 
well be inherent in the youth of Western cultures and as such may be the third variable 
correlating rising crime and unemployment; however, if crime among unemployed youth 
is rising faster than non-unemployed youth, then unemployment is at least a reinforcing 
factor in the rising crime rate. The study by the South Australian Working Party seems to 
bear this out. The increase in crime for unemployed offenders was significantly greater 
than that for non-unemployed offenders (school attenders and employed offenders). 
The conclusion is that the goal of reducing unemployment is socially desirable. 
Reduced unemployment is not a panacea, but certainly the attainment of full employment 
facilitates an improvement in the effectiveness of many socially desirable welfare 
objectives. For example, the tasks of anti-discrimination Boards would be more effective 
during a period of full employment because periods of high unemployment allow 
employers more easily to rationalize discrimination in employment policies. Also, a 
reduction in unemployment benefits (not necessarily the rate per person) and an increase 
in tax revenue not only removes an economic constraint on growth, but also releases 
more funds to finance both economic and social schemes. The opportunity costs of 
unemployment would also appear to be significant. 
1 .2 .2 The Economic Costs of Unemplovment 
Studies in the United Kingdom (1981) of the economic costs of unemployment 
have shown a major impact on the United Kingdom's budget. Most careful estimates, 
according to Tomlinson (1983, p387), suggest "that the budgetary impact of 2.88 million 
unemployed was approximately £13 billion. As an indication of the magnitudes of lost 
output, the Manpower Services Commission estimated that starting from a base level of 
700,0(X) [unemployed], each 1(X),(X)0 extra unemployed people cost £590 million of 
output forgone. Thus, the loss to the national economy of 3 million unemployed would 
be of the order of £13.6 billion of output." 
Estimates of forgone output for Australia have been conducted by Kalisch (1982) 
and Gruen and Chapman (1984), who revised Kalisch's investigation. They both found 
significant output losses due to unemployment. Potential Output (PO), from which 
foregone output is calculated, was derived by the formulae: 
PO = GDP [1 + b(U - F)] (1) 
where GDP denotes gross domestic product, u is the unemployment rate and b is Okun's 
Law coefficient: 
"In 1962 Okun argued that a decrease of one percentage point in the 
unemployment rate in the United States would lead to an increase in G.N .P. of 3.2 per 
cent" (Kalisch 1982, pi). This observed relationship between employment and output 
became known as Okun's Law. Using a time-series econometric approach, Kalisch 
(1982, plO) estimated Okun's Law coefficient (b) for Australia to be 2.748; a reduction 
of one percentage point in unemployment would yield a gain in output of 2.748 per cent. 
The full employment rate is denoted by F with the residual unemployment 
described as the natural rate of unemployment (NRU). The NRU is the residual 
unemployment that exists when the labour market is in equilibrium (i.e. labour demand 
and labour supply intersect). The residual unemployment is those persons currently 
moving between jobs. They are frictionally unemployed and are traditionally considered 
to be voluntarily unemployed. Structural unemployment, a mismatch in labour skills 
supplied and demanded, is often thought of as part of the NRU. 
Presented below is a table of forgone output for Australia during the eighties, for 
various arbitrarily-chosen levels of F(NRU). In the construction of this table Kalisch's 
(1982) estimate of the Okun's Law coefficient was retained and applied to recent ABS 
data. Both forgone and potential output are presented in Table 1.4. Output losses are 
significant at each level of NRU. Even when the NRU is assumed to be 6.0 per cent the 
total loss in GDP (average 1979/80 prices) for the period 1980-86 (at June) is 
approximately $9,253 million. Interestingly when the NRU is 6.0 per cent, potential and 
actual GDP in 1980 virtually coincide, while in 1981 the economy's output exceeded its 
potential level. 
Smith (1984, pl20) also states that "with an average rate of unemployment of 
450,000 persons [the level for Australia in 1982] we can expect to lose about $900 
million in tax revenue, and another $1200 million or so in unemployment benefits." 
Finally, the long term ramifications of persistently high levels of unemployment, while in 
part being a manifestation of poor structural change, may in turn, tend to make the 
economy less receptive to changes in consumption and production techniques. For 
example, it becomes increasingly difficult for firms in a climate of persistent high levels 
of unemployment, to adopt labour-saving capital perhaps due to union pressure. 
It has been demonstrated that a persistendy high level of unemployment is both 
socially and economically undesirable in terms of costs to the individual and society. 
Unemployment does matter and its reduction is a fruitful policy to pursue. If the 
designers of policy do not consider the social costs of unemployment, then the potential 
benefits of a policy designed to reduce unemployment will be underestimated. 
TABLE 1.4 Forgone Output for Australia af Tune 1980-1986 
(GDP $mill. at 1979/80 average prices) 
Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRU) (%) 
June 
GDP 
$mill 2.0 4.0 6.0 U(June) 
1980 GDP 
PO 
Forgone Output 
28636 
31862 
3226 
30288 
1653 
28715 
79 
6.1 
1981 GDP 
PO 
Forgone Output 
29880 
32508 
2628 
30865 
985 
29223 
(-)657 
5.2 
1982 GDP 
PO 
Forgone Output 
30079 
33881 
3802 
32228 
2149 
30575 
496 
6.6 
1983 GDP 
PO 
Forgone Output 
29607 
36116 
6509 
34489 
4882 
32861 
3254 
10.0 
1984 GDP 
PO 
Forgone Output 
32036 
38110 
6074 
36350 
4314 
34589 
2553 
8.9 
1985 GDP 
PO 
Forgone Output 
33659 
39486 
5827 
37636 
3977 
35786 
2127 
8.3 
1986 GDP 
PO 
Forgone Ou^ut 
33979 
39115 
5136 
37247 
3268 
35380 
1401 
7.5 
June '80 
to 
June '86 
Total Forgone 
Output: $mill. 33202 21228 9253 
b = 2.748 
Constructed from data in: 
1980-84, A.B.S. Time Series Data, Cat. No. 1311 
1985-86(2) A.B.S. Ubour Force Australia, Cat. No. 6202 
and National Income and Expenditure Cat. No. 5206. 
1 .3 ORTFrTTVES: AN OVERVIEW 
The aim of this study is to disaggregate registered unemployed into its various 
types according to the causes of unemployment. Unemployment may arise due to 
insufficient output, excessive real wages, structural and search factors. Isolating the 
causes of unemployment is directly relevant to policy formulation. The paper adopts a 
non-tâtonnement (i.e. without-auctioneer) approach. 
Economic theory can be dichotomized into two broad levels as depicted below. 
Equilibrium theory traditionally revolves around the Walrasian auctioneer where 
exchange in the market place (trade) occurs only when the market-clearing (equilibrium) 
prices are determined by an overseer. This analysis is most appropriate in markets such 
as the stock exchange, where trade occurs when supply and demand curves intersect. 
Underlying non-tâtonnement theory is the premise that an overseer or Walrasian 
auctioneer does not exist 
DIAGRAM 1.1 
Dichotomy of Economic Theory 
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Consequently, trade may occur in disequilibrium, where supply and demand 
curves do not intersect; trade may occur at above or below equilibrium prices. In the 
Walrasian market no trade occurs until equilibrium prices are found. The time that 
elapses during the tâtonnement process is not real economic time. A modem version of 
the Wakasian system is the re-contracting process, where contracts are agreed upon if 
prices are equilibrium prices; if they are not, then traders re-contract after renegotiating. 
The point is that without an auctioneer, prices do not instantaneously adjust to market 
disequilibrium. In other words, in the non-tâtonnement process, as Keynes highlights, 
quantities are a significant source of adjustment. 
Underlying the principle that trade occurs in disequilibrium is the concept of 
dynamics. Disequilibrium implies dynamics, but as Hey (1981) points out, this implies 
non-optimal behaviour. As a result, models where disequilibrium prices are assumed to 
be fixed have evolved in the literature of disequilibrium. Although they are static 
disequilibrium models, they are described as being in a steady-state and hence in 
equilibrium (SSE). It will be demonstrated that the assumption of non-tâtonnement in 
the labour market and the ensuing theory is an appropriate framework for the study of 
unemployment. 
The non-tâtonnement approach stems from the proposition that at least part of 
registered unemployment is a disequilibrium phenomenon. In other words, there are 
persons who are involuntarily unemployed; regardless of wage movements, labour may 
not be able to find work due to insufficient vacancies. This is an elusive concept, but it 
will be demonstrated that the elusive nature of this term can be overcome within a 
disequilibrium model. Consequendy, the specification and estimation procedure adopted 
by this paper will reflect the disequilibrium nature of the labour market. 
Given that non-tâtonnement trade underlies unemployment, then an estimation 
procedure which assumes that markets clear is logically inconsistent. This thesis 
discusses various non-tâtonnement estimation procedures. Since the thesis is attempting 
to disaggregate unemployment in the long run, it is supposed that wages are flexible and 
therefore endogenous. Thus a dynamic disequilibrium approach as opposed to a static 
disequilibrium approach is adopted. The problem of non-optimal behaviour is addressed 
within the dynamic estimation procedure adopted. Finally, non-tâtonnement economics 
has evolved out of a reappraisal of Keynes; the thrust of Keynesian economics is that 
quantities adjust faster than prices (as exemplified by the often-repeated assumption of 
fixed money wages in the short run). 
The disequilibrium approach also overcomes an inconsistency of the Neo-
classical theory; that is, Neo-Classical interpretations propose that unemployment may 
emanate from excessive (disequilibrium) real wages within a Walrasian framework. 
Therefore Neo-Classical theory (contrary to Classical) supposes a degree of 
disequilibrium. Consequently, both Keynesian and Neo-Classical doctrines can be 
captured by non-tâtonnement economics. This framework provides a simple dichotomy 
of unemployment into Keynesian and Neo-Classical. If prices react significantly faster 
than quantities, then the Neo-Classical analysis would be the prédominent explanation of 
unemployment. If quantities react faster than prices, then a Keynesian scenario 
dominates. This exposition of the two theories is crucial when one wants to distinguish 
their effects within a dynamic framework. 
It will also be demonstrated that there is almost no objective criterion clearly to 
distinguish between Keynesian and Neo-Classical theories of the labour market within a 
static (equilibrium) framework. The existence of a real wage overhang, for example, is 
not a sufficient criterion to distinguish between Keynesian and Neo-Classical 
unemployment. As a practical matter this point is highlighted by inspection of Table 1.5, 
which probably indicates that the steady rise in unemployment since 1973 is primarily the 
result of excessive real wages. "An index of unit labour cost - of how much must be 
spent on labour to produce a unit of output - [captures] ... real wage changes plus 
supplementary cost changes less productivity movements", (Hanratty and Vipond, 1982, 
pi99). Rising real unit labour costs may not necessarily be the result of rising real 
wages. Hanratty and Vipond (1982, pl99) state, however, that the main component of 
the rise in the real unit labour cost for the period 1973-75 was real wage movements. In 
the period 1966 to 1973 real unit labour costs remained constant, but rose by 0.7 per cent 
over the period 1973 to 1982 and by 0.4 per cent over the whole period 1966 to 1982. 
This undoubtedly indicates an excessive rise in labour costs; 9.7 per cent for the early 
period, 15.1 per cent during 1973-82 and an increase of 12.7 per cent over the whole 
period (1966-82). Labour productivity during 1973-82, however, increased at half the 
rate than for the period 1966-73, perhaps indicating that there was a dramatic decline in 
output for the period 1973-82. A decline in output, assuming downward rigidity of 
money wages, may result in excessive real wages due to a leftward shift of the marginal 
revenue product of labour function: the result could be described as a real wage 
overhang. In a Neo-Classical scenario a real wage overhang may result from an 
exogenous wage push, whereas a Keynesian may explain a real wages overhang in terms 
of a leftward shift in the marginal revenue product of labour schedule; or if real wages are 
specified on the vertical axis of a labour market diagram, a decline in output may be 
captured as a movement up the labour demand function. Consequently, the observed 
phenomenon of a real wage overhang can be explained by both scenarios. Therefore, the 
existence of an overhang does not distinguish between the two doctrines. A measure of 
the relative speeds of adjustment of wages and employment toward equilibrium on the 
other hand, will hopefully provide a criterion for distinguishing between Keynesian and 
Neo-Classical theories. To capture a Keynesian scenario (an exogenous change in 
output) on a labour market diagram is difficult; presumably a change in output will 
manifest itself via a change in price. This difficulty is avoided by Patinkin (1956,1965) 
whose arguments are developed in the following sections. 
TABLE 1.5 
Nonfarm Productivity and Related Trends 
Sentemher 1966-Sentember 1982 
Sept 1966 
- Sept 1973 
Sept 1973 - Sept 1982 
Sept 1966 - Sept 1982 
Productivity^ 3.6% 1.9% 2.7% 
Labour costs^ 9.7 15.1 12.7 
Unit labour costs^ 5.9 12.9 9.8 
Real labour costs^ 3.6 2.8 3.1 
Real unit labour costs® 0.0 0.7 0.4 
Price inflation^ 5.9 12.0 9.3 
a Gross nonfarm output at 1979-80 prices per hour worked by nonfarm employees, 
b Nonfarm labour compensation (wages, salaries, supplements, payroll taxes) per hour worked, 
c Labour costs divided by productivity. 
^ Labour costs divided by implicit price deflator for gross nonfarm product 
® Unit labour costs divided by implicit price deflator for gross nonfarm product 
f Implicit price deflator for gross nonfarm product 
Source: Mitchell D J.B. (1984), The Australian Labour Market. Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
Discussion Paper No. Bl, p.24. 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2 . 1 NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMTCS 
At a broad level two variants of unemployment theory exist. One is the Lucas and 
Rapping (1969) model, which explains short-run variation in employment within an 
equilibrium framework. Consequently, all unemployment is voluntary. The other 
interpretation permits degrees of disequilibrium and therefore involuntary unemployment. 
It will be shown in this section that a disequilibrium approach to Neo-Classical 
unemployment is appropriate, thus allowing for a clear distinction to be drawn between 
Classical and Neo-Classical labour markets. 
According to Shapiro (1974), the Classical theory evolved from the writings of 
Ricardo, Mill, Say and Marshall, long before the appearance of Keynes' 'General 
Theory', in 1936. "The Walrasian [Neo-Classical] system does not allow for market 
imperfections in the form of unions, minimum wage law, etc., and Say's Law does not 
allow for excess supply in markets" (Hughes and Perlman, 1984, p54). Say's Law is 
commonly stated as: the supply of goods and services creates its own demand. The 
implication is that there is no over-production. According to Harris (1981, p92), Say's 
Law asserts "that real national income is always at the full-employment level, since the 
corresponding supply of goods is always matched by demand". Say's Law, it is argued, 
is still valid when it is acknowledged that savings decreases consumption. In the 
Classical scheme, interest rates will decline which would stimulate investment to offset 
the decline in consumption. Aggregate demand cannot be deficient since savings and 
investment are synchronized by interest rates. Harris (1981), however, argues that there 
is a distinction between Say's Identity and Say's Law; the precise meaning or 
interpretation of Say is controversial. Say's Identity, where supply equals demand in the 
market when trade occurs, does not necessarily rule out the possibility of over-
production. "As Sowell (1974) demonstrates, even Say himself admitted the possibility 
of general gluts" (Harris, 1981, p97). The Neo-Classical theory, like the Classical 
theory, utilizes Say's and Wakas' law. Neo-Classical theory however, relies more on 
the writings of Pigou: the Theory of Unemployment (1933) and Lapses from Full 
Employment (1944). Pigou in his writings acknowledges the imperfect nature of 
markets, in particular labour markets, and therefore unlike the Classical theory allows for 
bouts of involuntary unemployment. A number of institutional factors, such as unions, 
heterogeneous labour, segmented labour markets, and the immobility of labour between 
markets were, according to Solow (1980), addressed by Pigou in his writings:^ 
"Pigou's remarks in the middle of the great depression, to the Macmillan Committee, 
when asked to explain why unemployment was so high, were... that the relative demand 
for labour in different occupations had altered, and the transfers of labour appropriate to 
those alterations have not taken place" (Lekachman, 1969, p50-51). 
Solow (1980, p4) further argues that, in Pigou's 1933 paper, he made reference 
to minimum wages: "He [Pigou] wrote 'public opinion...builds up for itself a rough 
estimate of what constitutes a reasonable living wage. This is derived half-consciously 
from a knowledge of the actual standards enjoyed by more or less average workers'... 
Such feelings about equity and fairness are obviously relevant to setting statutory 
minimum wages, and Pigou uses them in that way". Interestingly, in 1907 in Australia, 
"Mr Justice Higgins was obliged to rule on what was a fair and reasonable wage rate 
sufficient to meet the needs of an average family man" (Veale et.al., 1983, pl44). This 
resembles present day arguments that unemployment is Neo-Classical in the sense that 
economic and social institutions prevent the clearing of labour markets. Knowledge of 
"average workers' standards" implies wage comparisons and perhaps margins. Another 
factor mentioned by Pigou is the provision of unemployment insurance (Solow, 1980, 
p5). A strong inference is that wages need not adjust instantaneously to market forces in 
a Neo-Classical framework. Neo-Classical theory, as distinct from the Classical theory, 
permits a greater degree of disequilibrium. 
See Solow (1980) for a detailed discussion. 
Both the Neo-Classical and Classical labour demand functions are based on two 
overlapping hypotheses. Firstly, firms are perfectly competitive in supplying their 
products and hiring labour, and they maximize profits. The second hypothesis, which is 
a corollary of the first, is that employed labour exhibits diminishing marginal returns. 
According to the first proposition, firms will be in equilibrium when the marginal product 
of labour is equal to the market real wage. The second hypothesis dictates that firms are 
induced to hire additional labour when real wages decline; this inverse relationship is 
depicted by Ld in Diagram 2.1. Labour supply too is a function of the real wage, 
reflecting the choice between employment and leisure. The higher the real wage, the 
higher is the opportunity cost of leisure. When supply equals demand, equilibrium in the 
labour market is achieved. There is no involuntary unemployment; all those desiring 
employment are in fact working. This long run position, depicted by point E, is a 
characteristic of both the Classical and Neo-Classical theory, where in the long-run only 
frictional unemployment exists. In contrast to the Classical theory, the Neo-Classical 
doctrine explains short-run variation in (involuntary) unemployment (at Wi in diagram 
2.1). Indeed, according to Hughes and Perlman (1984, p55), "adjustment takes time -
how long depending on how fast workers react to their predicament (i.e. disequilibrium) 
by adjusting their wages to put themselves back on their supply curve. There is nothing 
in Walrasian analysis to tell just how long this 'groping' toward equilibrium takes place, 
but it occurs rapidly enough so that there is no room in the analysis for a 'great 
depression'... [Adjustment is primarily via flexible wage (price) movements]... The 
theory would even admit to some small amount of long-run [involuntary] unemployment 
if workers refuse to lower their real wage because of institutional factors". This echoes 
the thoughts of Pigou. 
The search theory of unemployment is distinguished from frictional 
unemployment in that real wages are assumed to be too high to clear the labour market. 
Briefly, it has been postulated that over the years, people have steadily been searching 
longer for employment due to changes in social and economic institutions. 
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Rising unemployment benefits have been singled out as a significant factor in explaining 
an increase in search unemployment. The advent of these benefits has lowered the 
opportunity cost of being unemployed; higher real wages are therefore necessary to attract 
labour into employment. Wachtel (1984, p267), states more formally that "the 
unemployed are said to have a reservation [wage] because their ability to acquire income 
through unemployment compensation deters them from taking certain jobs. A reservation 
wage is the wage rate that will induce an individual to forsake unemployment". Search 
theory assumes that efficient search activity occurs only when one is not working. 
While this version of the Neo-Classical doctrine explains short-run variations in 
unemployment, the Classical theory does not. Both the Classical and Neo-Classical 
theories are general models and are embedded in Walras' Law. The salient features of 
Walras' Law are: 
i) equilibrium is achieved instantaneously by price adjustment; and 
ii) trade in the market place does not occur out of equilibrium. 
The only steady-states are Walrasian equilibria, with market-clearing equilibrium prices. 
"Walras' law implies that all prices cannot change in the same direction and that relative 
prices must change." (Varian, 1975, p218). The equality or intersection of supply and 
demand is first achieved and then trade or exchange occurs between buyers and sellers. 
With respect to the labour market, exchange will only occur at point E in diagram 2.1; by 
definition involuntary unemployment does not occur. Yet Neo-Classical theory as voiced 
by Pigou, acknowledges the imperfect nature of labour markets and therefore allows for 
bouts of involuntary [disequilibrium] unemployment.^ The Neo-Classical theory as 
distinct from the Classical model, may explain short-run involuntary unemployment; it is 
however, inconsistent with Say's Law and Walras' Law and therefore constitutes a 
theoretical break from Wakas' general framework. The Lucas and Rapping (1969) 
2 It may be pointed out that when labour supply and labour demand functions intersect, the 
existence of frictional (voluntary) unemployment implies non-t^tonnement; equilibrium prices may not 
clear the market. The fact that labour is searching suggests that the Wahasian auctioneer is not 
overseeing the market and providing complete information about wage rates and employment 
opportunities. 
mcxiel overcomes this inconsistency by explaining short-run variation in unemployment 
within an equilibrium framework where all trade occurs at equilibrium positions. 
As asserted by them, the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model (estimated for the 
period 1930-65) is Keynesian, but according to Rees (1970, p306) it appears to be "more 
Classical than Keynesian". The model describes a labour market that is in continuous 
short-run equilibrium (i.e. where labour supply equals labour demand). Those persons 
who want jobs have them; unemployment is therefore voluntary. The model is depicted 
graphically in diagram 2.2. Briefly, the economy is in long-run equilibrium at EQ where 
long-run full employment (L^e) is given by the long-run supply of labour curve (L^e). 
Suppose that the short-run full employment level is now L^e. The reduction in 
employment (measured as L^e - L^e) is purely voluntary. Rees (1970, p306) states: 
"the short-run supply is always equal to employment. Measured unemployment, though 
it is a component of the long-run labour supply [Le^], is not a part of the short-run 
supply [SL^s]. This is equivalent to assuming that measured unemployment is 
voluntary....Since Lucas and Rapping do not regard measured unemployment as part of 
the short-run supply of labour, how do they regard it? In their own words, it is viewed 
'not as an effective market supply, part of which cannot find employment, but rather as 
the supply of labour which would be forthcoming at perceived nominal wages and 
prices.' Measured unemployment (more exactly its non-frictional component) is then 
viewed as consisting of persons who regard the wage rates at which they could currently 
be employed as temporarily too low, and who therefore choose to wait or search for 
improved conditions rather than to invest in moving or occupational choice." 
The authorities could attempt to artificially move the economy back to EQ. The 
result would be reduced unemployment at the expense of price inflation; this resembles 
the trade-off embodied in a stable short-run Phillips curve (where price is on the vertical 
axis), although the original Phillips curve used the rate of change of money wages instead 
of prices. Alternatively, the authorities could allow the economy to adjust to its long-run 
position (at E2). The voluntarily unemployed revise their wage expectations downwards 
and accept a lower wage. 
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Rees (1970, p308) criticizes Lucas' and Rapping's (1969) model on two fronts. 
He argues that "when all markets are depressed in varying degree, a few of the 
unemployed might still be able to find work by shifting their location or trade, but it is 
surely not true that all of them could do so at once". Rees (1970, p308) further points 
out that most Keynesians would argue that, even with flexible wages, aggregate demand 
would be reduced further if all workers reduce their wage. Patinkin's (1956, 1965) 
labour market model, developed later in this paper, shows that a general decline in real 
wages may not increase employment. The second misgiving concerns the model's 
inability to explain the long bouts of mass unemployment that occurred in the "ten years 
of depression in the U.S. and even longer in the U.K" (Hughes and Perlman, 1984, 
p55). In the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model the voluntarily unemployed hold out for 
jobs because the wage is 'temporarily' too low; however, as Rees (1970, p308) 
remarks, "it is hard to imagine the long-term unemployed holding out for jobs, 
comparable with their old jobs, at their old real compensation, over periods of up to ten 
years". Not all unemployment during the Great Depression was voluntary. 
A final misgiving is that the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model, like Friedman's 
'inflation-unemployment model', incorrectly predicts that the rate at which people quit 
jobs falls during a boom and rises during a recession. This is reflected by the proposition 
that the stable short-run traditional Phillips Curve is implied by the Lucas and Rapping 
(1969) model. Both theories also ignore the reality that most people do not voluntarily 
quit their jobs, in order to search for another job. Indeed, during a period of declining or 
slowly growing real wages, often the consequence of a recession (since wages and 
economic activity may be procyclical), workers will be less inclined to quit their current 
employment. Search activity tends to rise during a boom (when unemployment is low) 
and decline during a recession (i.e. high unemployment). 
It has been demonstrated that the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model, while 
explaining short-run variation in unemployment within an equilibrium framework, has 
some theoretical problems. In particular it does not acknowledge involuntary 
unemployment, principally because involuntary unemployment can only be addressed in 
a disequilibrium framework. The proposition that unemployment is a manifestation of 
non-tâtonnement can be drawn from Pigou's writings. However, the inconsistency of 
the Neo-Classical model still exists; i.e. disequilibrium trade within a Walrasian 
framework. A modification of Walras' Law, or a theory of disequilibrium where the 
market is not regulated by an auctioneer, is developed in the next section. Indeed, as 
Cherry (1981) points out, Keynesians argue that labour markets do not operate as auction 
markets. If trade does not occur at equilibrium prices, where does it occur? 
2.2 NON-TATONNEMENT TI^APE IN THE MAFKF;T PLACE 
The short-side (clearing or trade) rule will determine what transaction, or quantity 
of trade, takes place in the market when prices are not equilibrium ones. 
Three axioms of trading out of equilibrium exist in the literature. They are: 
i) rationed sellers and rationed buyers cannot exist in the same market. Households 
are sellers of labour time and buyers of goods in the product market. Firms on 
the other hand, are buyers of labour time and sellers of goods. When a market is 
characterized by excess supply (D<S) then sellers are rationed (quantity-
constrained). When excess demand (D>S) occurs in the market buyers become 
rationed; excess supply and excess demand in the same market cannot occur 
simultaneously; 
ii) efficiency: neither side would benefit from any extra trade; and 
iii) exchange in the market place (trade) is voluntary;^. 
These axioms ensure that the actual quantity transacted is the lesser of the amount 
demanded or supplied, depending on the state of the market. If the disequilibrium state 
of the market generated excess supply (i.e. actual price above equilibrium price) then the 
3 Voluntary trade posits a crucial proposition in welfare economics, that is, voluntary trade is 
mutually beneficial to both transacting agents (objective or utility functions are maximized). Trade that 
occurs in equilibrium positions leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes. However, when acuial trade occurs at 
Uie lesser of supply and demand (i.e. actual price equilibrium price), this leads to non-Pareto-optimal 
outcomes, because of reduced volumes of exchange (trade) in tiie market. That is, actu^ trade is less Uian 
desired or equilibrium trade. Behaviour, however, is still optimal to Uie extent that individuals maximize 
their objective functions given all tiiese constraints, including quantity constraints. 
actual quantity sold would be equal to the amount demanded. Sellers will be quantity-
constrained. "The quantity traded in the market is determined by the quantity people wish 
to buy at this high price rather than the larger quantity producers wish to sell" (Bowden, 
1978a, plO). If the disequilibrium market generated excess demand (a price below the 
equilibrium price), then the amount actually sold would be equal to the amount which 
sellers wish to supply. Buyers are therefore quantity-constrained. "The basic idea 
behind [the short-side rule] is that consumers cannot be sold more than what they want, 
and that not more can be sold than is produced." (Bowden, 1978a, plO). 
Sinclair (1987, p66) elaborates: "When a market fails to clear, either buyers or 
sellers will be unable to trade in the quantities they would like to at the going 
[disequilibrium] prices. When the quantity demanded falls short of the quantity offered 
for sale, there is excess supply. This characterizes a buyer's market: buyers have no 
trouble in purchasing what they want to buy. Sellers will be eager to seek them out. The 
opposite occurs when demand outstrips supply. Here we encounter a seller's market; 
buyers cannot buy all they wish, while sellers can afford to be choosey. The essential 
idea governing the actual volume of trade in such circumstances is the short-side 
principle. This stipulates that the effective quantity transacted will be whichever is lower 
of demand and supply. It in turn suggests that one side of the market will be [non-
priced] rationed in the quantity of trade they can undertake". 
Casson (1981, p41-2) succinctly explains: "because transactions are voluntary, 
the quantity traded cannot exceed either the amount demand [D] or supplied [S]. And 
because traders will not forgo opportunities for mutually beneficial transactions, the 
quantity traded [Q] will never be less than the minimum of the demand and supply. The 
actual quantity traded [Q] must therefore be equal to the minimum of demand and 
supply." Consequently, trade occurs on what is called the short-side of the market (i.e. 
either demand is short and D<S, or supply is short annd D>S). The rule is stated below: 
Q = Min(D,S) 
An example of trading on the short-side in reference to the labour market is 
provided by point A in diagram 2.1. Here the labour market is characterized by excess 
labour supply; labour is rationed (quantity-constrained) in selling some of its labour time. 
The actual amount of labour traded, in this example, is the amount of labour demanded 
by firms. Point D indicates that the quantity (of labour) that is traded in the market place 
is the quantity (of labour) supplied. Assuming that the gap AB describes involuntary 
unemployment, the relevance of disequilibrium theory becomes apparent. Point B is an 
example of the long-side of the market. 
In contrast, within the Walrasian general equilibrium theory, individuals are able 
to buy and sell as much of a commodity (be it labour or consumption goods) as they 
want; they are not quantity-constrained. Hence, optimum trade in consumption or 
employment is decided upon by economic agents given other constraints; mainly, given 
prices and endowment of income (i.e. budget constraints). Thus, a modification of the 
Walrasian system is that firms and consumers are constrained not only by endowments 
and given prices, but also by quantities. Consequentiy, trade other than at equilibrium 
can occur on the short-side of the market along the locus LD, E, LS in diagram 2.1. 
Point E depicts market-clearing equilibrium prices. The remaining points along LD and 
Ls depict non-clearing disequilibrium prices; disequilibrium trade occurs on the short-
side of the market. Equipped with this basic theory of disequilibrium trade, the Neo-
classical theory is able to explain short-run bouts of involuntary unemployment: real 
wages may not adjust instantaneously, due to institutional rigidities and poor information 
flows, while prices still react significantly faster than quantity. 
A number of choice-theoretic disequilibrium models, which are not without 
theoretical problems, have evolved in the literature or disequilibrium, such as Muellbauer 
and Portes (1978) and its descendant work by Honkapohja and Ito (1985). A choice-
theoretic framework preserves the traditional assumptions of economic agents as rational 
optimizing individuals. These models are based on maximizing objective functions (i.e. 
profit and utility functions); that is, objective functions are maximized given the usual 
Wab-asian constraints plus a quantity constraint which is a manifestation of the short-side 
rule which they employ. The models assume fixed prices (wages). This may be 
inappropriate since, as Bowden (1978a) points out, tiie information requirements of the 
short-side rule implies paradoxically that markets may not persist in a state of 
disequilibrium. Strictly, the short-side rule implies that in equilibrium all that is offered is 
sold. "This implies that all buyers must have the facility of making successful contact 
with sellers in the period considered. Similar remarks hold for other [disequilibrium] 
prices" (Bowden, 1978a, pi 1). If the market is characterized by excess demand (W 
< W®) and trade occurs on the short-side of the market, then "all sellers are successfully 
sought out by buyers" (Bowden, 1978a, pll) . When excess supply exists (W > W®), 
"all buyers are successfully located by sellers" (Bowden, 1978a, pl l) . Informational 
flows are not impeded; disequilibrium therefore may not persist. Consequently, the 
short-side rule has normally been applied to administered or fixed-price disequilibrium 
models. The frequent practice of appending a price-adjustment equation to a market 
model for econometric purposes in conjunction with the short-side rule of the form, 
Pt-PM = f(D-S) (2) 
is therefore inconsistent. Hey (1981, p20) further remarks that "at an aggregate level, 
optimizing and equilibrium necessarily go hand-in-hand or... optimizing and [dynamic] 
disequilibrium are incompatible. [Dynamic] disequilibrium implies that some decision-
maker has been frustrated in his plans, but if someone is frustrated, then optimizing has 
not been achieved." Furthermore, Rosen and Quandt (1978, p374) point out that the 
price-adjustment equation also "lacks a choice-theoretic foundation". Moreover, 
according to Honkapohja and Ito (1985), there appears to be no satisfactory theory 
explaining why price (wages) should be rigidly fixed in the short-run. Benessy's 
(1976), Hahn's (1978) and Nigishi's (1979) conjectural equilibria analysis (cited in 
Honkapohja and Ito (1985)), however, attempts to provide a model to explain short-run 
price and wage rigidity. Briefly, the theory is analogous to oligopoly price theory, where 
if a labourer conjectures that other workers will follow his lower wage offer, then that 
person's employability is unchanged. Fixed-price disequilibrium models are equilibrium 
models, (i.e. SSE), even though disequilibrium unemployment is being studied. Since 
prices in these models are not flexible they do not perform their function of rationing 
among different consumers over time. 
As a result, these models make explicit non-price rationing schemes. Briefly, 
economic agents who face not only the usual Walrasian constraints but also quantity 
constraints (in that they may not be able to buy or sell as much of a good as they desire) 
will be rationed. Stochastic rationing occurs where rationed agents may be either totally 
satisfied or totally dissatisfied. Altematively, a deterministic rationing device means that 
all rationed agents are partly satisfied. Agents may be allocated output in proportion to 
their stated demand or allocated equal amounts (a uniform scheme). A proportional 
scheme is manipulable in that actual trade is a function of stated trades. As Drazen (1980) 
points out, a rationed agent may overbid in order to increase actual trade and realize 
his/her desired trade. An example of overbidding, given by Muellbauer and Portes 
(1978), is the placing of multiple or extra orders by constrained agents. Drazen (1980) 
further points out that, if all agents behave in a similar fashion, no S SE will exist. A 
uniform scheme may force persons to over-supply or over-consume, thus violating the 
voluntary aspect of the trading rule; as an example, labour may be forced to work 
overtime. Furthermore, a uniform scheme suggests a rationing centre and as Grandmont 
(1977) points out this is synonymous to assuming a tâtonnement in quantities. If 
quantities can be centrally co-ordinated, so too can prices. Consequently, quantity 
constraints need never arise. The stochastic scheme conforms to reality and is more 
plausible in a situation where a constrained agent either gets his demand or supply 
completely satisfied, or gets nothing at all."̂  
Honkapohja and Ito (1985) extended Muellbauer's and Portes' model (1978) by 
using a stochastic rationing scheme as opposed to a deterministic rationing scheme. The 
contribution of Muellbauer and Portes (1978) was to include inventories in their static 
disequilibrium model. A forerunner to these models was the Barro and Grossman (1971) 
general (static) disequilibrium model.^ These are two-market models, taking into 
4 See Svensson (1980), Benassy (1982), Green (1980), Honkapohja and Ito (1985) and Hey (1981) 
for worked numerical examples of the various schemes. 
5 The Barro and Grossman (1971) model is a synthesis of the analyses of Patinkin (1956) and 
Glower (1965). These evolved out of a reinterpretation of Keynes, theory in which they argue that 
Keynesian theory is best interpreted as a disequilibrium theory. Contributions to this line of thought 
have also been made by Malinvaud (1977). 
account the spillover effect of dissatisfied demand or supply in one market into other 
markets. The short-side rule is made explicit in these models, except in the Barro and 
Grossman model, where it is implied. This rule, however, has some further problems. 
Benassy (1982, pl2) makes the point that the short-side rule, when applied to a multi-
market economy, will lead to inconsistent transactions, violating either feasibility or the 
budget constraints of the agents. Consider a "firm in a situation of excess demand for its 
inputs and outputs. Since there is excess demand in the input markets, the firm 
purchases fewer inputs than its Walrasian demand. However, since there is excess 
demand in the output markets and the firm is a seller, sales or output should equal the 
Wakasian supplies. The application of the short-side rule would thus call for producing 
the Walrasian inputs - a technologically unfeasible situation. Analogously, imagine a 
household facing excess supply for the goods it purchases and the goods it sells. Under 
the short-side rule, its sales would be lower than its Walrasian supplies but its purchases 
would be equal to its Walrasian demands. As a result this household's transactions 
would violate the budget constraint". Consequentiy, the theory of exchange and demand 
needs to be reformulated. 
"If agents are rationed in one market, their actions in other markets, where they 
still have freedom to transact as they wish, are likely to change as a result. This gives 
rise to an important distinction between notional [Wakasian] and effective demands or 
supplies. The notional demand for goods by households, for example, is the quantity 
they would like to buy, at the going set of [equilibrium] prices and wages, if they are able 
to achieve their desired trades in all markets. If they are not [able to achieve their desired 
trades] as a result, let us say, of excess supply prevailing in the labour market, their 
effective demand for goods will be the amount they wish to buy, once they know that 
they will be unable to seU all the labour time they want" (Sinclair, 1987, p66). Labour is 
quantity-constrained in the labour market, which will spill over and impact on the goods 
or product market. Likewise, a firm's effective demand for labour is influenced by sales 
constraints that a firm faces in the product market. 
Subsequently, a body of literature has evolved which draws a distinction between 
notional (Walrasian) and effective demand. Generally, effective demand is defined as 
demand expressed in the market, taking into account quantity constraints. Varían (1975, 
p218) succinctly explains that the "demands actually presented in the market i.e., the 
demands that affect price movements, are not Walrasian demands. Rather they are 
effective demands; these demands are a function of both price and quantity signals." On 
the other hand, the notional demand for consumer goods (Q) assumes that labour, in 
attempting to maximize utility [U = f(Q,Ls)], can sell as much labour (Ls) as they 
desire,(Hanratty and Vipond, 1982, pi70). The utility function is based on the notion 
that households, in a Walrasian model, make simultaneous decisions about how much 
labour time to supply and how much output to demand or consume; this is termed the 
dual decision hypothesis by Glower (1965). The effective demand for final goods 
assumes that labour is quantity-constrained; labour can sell only as much labour time as 
the product market demands. Effective demand for goods by households is derived by 
re-specifying the utility function with quantity constraints; there are a number of variants 
of this within the literature of disequilibrium. All the above authors employ this 
distinction in their models.^ 
Fixed-price disequilibrium (i.e. SSE) theory is not without difficulties. Given a 
two-market model and a vector of disequilibrium prices and wages, four regimes that 
have evolved from disequilibrium literature can be identified. The two of particular 
relevance are: 
i) (New)Keynesian unemployment, and 
ii) Neo-Classical unemployment. 
6 The theory of effective demand is quite extensive. Briefly, however, there are two types of 
effective demands: (i) the Drke (1975) and (ii) Clower (1965) demands. The Drke (1975) demand is 
where an agent maximizes utility by incorporating all quantity constraints, i.e. quantity constraints in the 
market the agent is trading in and all other markets. This effective demand, however, does not yield a 
measure of disequilibrium in that effective demand will equal effective supply. The Clower (1965) 
effective demand is the demand expressed in one market but taking into account quantity constraints in all 
other markets. While Clower (1965) gives a measure of disequilibrium, it does not emerge from 
optimizing behaviour. For a detailed analysis see Green (1980) and Honkapohja and Ito (1985). The 
latter, therefore, employ a stochastic rationing scheme because, as they remark, it provides a "natural 
measure of market imbalances and consistent micro-foundations of effective demands" (Honkapohja and 
Ito, 1985, p67). Barro and Grossman (1971), Malinvaud (1977) and Portes and Muellbauer (1978) 
employ Glower's (1965) concept of effective demand. 
Neo-Classical economics, with respect to the labour market, breaks from the Wakasian 
(equilibrium) framework and permits, as implied by Pigou, degrees of disequilibrium due 
to institutional factors; excess labour (involuntary unemployment) arises from excess real 
wages due to unions and/or central wage determining processes. (New)Keynesian j 
theory embraces a dynamic disequilibrium (non-tatonnement) framework, in which real 
wages are flexible, yet involuntary (Keynesian) unemployment can still be extracted. 
Institutional factors are not the underlying explanation of involuntary unemployment. 
This line of theorizing is pursued in section 2.3. In contrast the Neo-Keynesian theory, 
as exemplified by Hick's IS-LM model, is essentially an equilibrium framework, 
sometimes called the Neo-Classical synthesis. The only way to extract Keynesian 
unemployment is to impose, for example, the assumption of money wage rigidity; 
however, the difference between Neo-Classical and Neo-Keynesian unemployment 
becomes unclear. The Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian theories are both embedded in 
a disequilibrium framework. 
Post-Keynesian economics, led by Joan Robinson and Piero Sraffa, revolves 
around the Cambridge controversies on capital (Clarke, 1989/90, pi61), and focuses on 
income distributions, (Canterbery, 1987, p274). Sraffa modernized some thoughts of 
the Classical economists by revamping Ricardo's labour theory of value and emphasizing 
the circularity of the production process; Sraffa's contribution to Post-Keynesian thought 
is sometimes called Neo-Ricardian. Post-Keynesian theorizing also embraces 
disequilibrium; (New)Keynesian and Post-Keynesian theories to this extent overlap. 
Presented in table 2.1 is (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical unemployment where the 
nature of the product market is made explicit 
The bar denotes effective supply (S ) or demand (D). The absence of a bar 
subscript denotes Walrasian (notional) supply and demand in the respective markets. The 
symbols in the brackets provide an alternative specification of disequilibrium: 
equilibrium would be denoted by for example, LD = LS and therefore LD = (LD) 
TABLE 2.1 F^gim^S 
Labour Product 
market (L) market (Q) 
(1) (New)Keynesian 
unemployment 
LD<LS 
(LD<LD) 
QD<QS 
(QD<QD) 
(2) Neo-Classical 
unemployment 
LD<LS 
(LD < LD) 
QD>QS 
(Qs < Qs) 
(effective demand equals notional demand). The distinction between (New)Keynesian 
and Neo-Classical scenarios is quite clear. While in both the Neo-Classical and 
(New)Keynesian scenarios, output is insufficient to clear the labour market, the 
underlying cause is quite different. This is apparent in the diagrammatical (2.3) 
representation of the respective product markets. For (New)Keynesians, product prices 
are too high to clear the product and hence labour markets (Layard and Nickell, 1985). 
In a Walrasian framework trade will only occur in equilibrium (Qd = Qs)» and generate 
Qd> but assuming disequilibrium, effective demand for output (Qd) can be less than Qd 
(Part A). Sinclair (1987, p67) elaborates: (New)Keynesian unemployment is 
characterized by excess supply in both the labour and product markets. This position is 
reached by starting from a Walrasian equilibrium and raising the price level. "Firms will 
react to the cut in the real wage that a higher price level implies, when the money wage is 
given, by wanting to employ more people and sell more output. This will be the change 
in its notional demand and supply. But it will be frustrated... A higher price level 
...[ceteris paribus]... means a fall in the households' real financial wealth. 
[Households] will seek to cut back their spending. We have asumed that consumption 
Diagram 2.3 
The (New^ Kevnesian Product Market 
Price PART A 
(Qd < QD) 
Qo 
QD < Qs Qs 
— — — - X ^ — 
1 
1 (2D(Equilibrium) 
\ 
1 
Q. 1 
1 1 1 1 
QD 
Qo Qd Quantity (Q) 
Price The Neo-Classicai Product Market (Qs < 0«) 
PART B 
QD = QD (Equilibrium) 
Qs Q, Quantity (Q) 
QD, Qs = Walrasian (notional) product demand and supply respectively 
^ ^ = Effecdve product demand and supply 
bears a constant proportionate relation to their real money holdings... Firms will 
perceive that they are forced to accept a reduced volume of sales, despite the incentive to 
increase production that the higher price level brought... They simply cannot sell 
everything which it is profitable to produce at the new price level". A corollary to this 
scenario, which will be developed in section 2.3, is that a reduction in the real wage is 
not sufficient to reduce unemployment; "in the Great Depression, prices and wages did 
fall" (Frank, 1986, p8). 
In the Neo-Classical regime the real wage is artificially forced up or kept high, 
resulting in excess demand on the product market; the supply curve has shifted to the 
left and settled at Qs in Part B of diagram 2.3. An increase in price will restore 
equilibrium in a Neo-Classical framework in both the labour and product market; real 
wages will decline and output would expand along Qs in part B of diagram 2.3. In 
contrast, an increase in price will exacerbate (New)Keynesian unemployment. 
It is apparent from Levacic and Rebmann (1988) that underlying the 
(New)Keynesian regime is the analysis of Patinkin (1956, 1965), where real wages 
move pro-cyclically. The particular importance of Patinkin's analysis, along with 
Glower's (1965) dual decision hypothesis, is that it provides consistency between micro-
economics and macro-economics. Grandmont et.al. (1978, p84) state that 
"disequilibrium paves the way for a reconciliation between micro and macro theory". For 
example, deriving a household's demand for goods from a utility function, which 
includes quantity constraints, yields micro (household) demand functions similar to the 
form of an aggregate consumption function. Patinkin's disequilibrium interpretation of 
Keynes also clarifies the elusive concept of involuntary unemployment. Briefly, 
involuntary unemployment may exist at equilibrium wages; that is, LD< LD while LD = 
Ls. For this to occur firms (and labour) must be off their respective curves, and the 
labour market may be characterized by a non-clearing equilibrium price of labour. These 
issues are addressed in the next section, where it is also shown that the Keynesian 
analysis is best embraced by a dynamic disequilibrium framework. 
2 . 3 ( I S E W ) K F Y N E S Ï A N P C O N Q M I C S ; 
2 . 3 . 1 Kevnes and Non-Tatonnement 
A conclusion reached by the Neo-Classical economists was that cyclical economic 
upturns are inversely related to the real wage rate. Patinkin (1956, 1965) using a 
disequilibrium framework, alters this conclusion. Moreover, unemployment is generated 
through insufficient output without placing restrictions on the movement of the real wage, 
thus providing an unambiguous definition of involuntary unemployment; the non-clearing 
equilibrium real wage means labour is off its labour supply function. A disequilibrium 
approach to Keynes is, according to Benassy (1982, p2), the relevant framework. He 
states: "macroeconomic models in the Keynesian tradition...violate the main 
characteristics of equilibrium economics: (i) since the labour market [exhibits] 
unemployment, at least one market is not in equilibrium, (ii) some adjustments are not 
brought about by price movements alone, e.g. the goods market is equilibriated through 
movements in the level of national income [quantity] and finally, (iii) agents do not react 
only to price signals e.g., the Keynesian consumption function depends on the level of 
income". 
ThelS-LM framework and its notions of equilibrium is not Keynes. Hey (1981, 
p204) remarks: "the demand for labour function in the standard IS-LM model is the 
usual marginal product of labour curve; this embodies the implicit assumption of 
unconstrained behaviour". Patinkin (1956, 1965) criticizes this underiying assumption 
of the Classical/Keynesian labour demand curve, and evolves a theory of the labour 
market where unemployment is seen to be a consequence of disequilibrium. Position B 
in Diagram 2.4 implies that the firm is not quantity-constrained in the output market and 
can sell all that it can produce (Kennedy, 1985). In microeconomics, labour demand 
f u n c t i o n s s h o w t h e q u a n t i t y of l a b o u r 
Diagram 2.4 
Ttig PatinKin La^?ftur Marhgt 
W® = Equilibrium real wage 
Wi = Actual (disequilibrium) real wage 
Ld, Ls = Walrasian (notional) labour demand and labour supply function respectively 
Ld = Effective demand for labour 
Q, "Q = Walrasian (notional) and effective level of output respectively 
Real 
Wages (W) 
^ (LD=LD) = Ls 
Labour (L,L) 
Lo(Q) Ld(Q) 
NB: Controversy exists over Keynes' labour market. That is, is the labour supply function solely a 
function of money wages? "Leontief (1937) maintained that Keynes had assumed that workers 
were subject to money illusions" (Addison and Burton, 1982, p3). However, "the nearest 
....Keynes comes to a precise formulation of the crucial issue is his assertion that the supply of 
labour depends not upon real but (also) upon money wages" (Ibid, p4). This paper assumes that 
labour may not suffer from money illusion and therefore accepts Patinkin's supply of labour 
function as a function of real wages. 
demanded by firms, at given real wage levels, assuming that firms can sell all the output 
they desire at the prevailing product price. Points on a labour demand function assume 
that firms are not quantity-constrained. For example, a given level of employment 
implies a 
given level of output; a higher level of employment, captured as a movement down a 
labour demand function, implies a higher level of output. Increased employment levels 
will only occur if the extra output is sold. Points on the labour demand function, 
therefore, imply unconstrained behaviour in terms of firms choosing employment and 
output levels without hindrance; i.e. no sales constraint. Patinkin (1956, 1965), derives 
an effective demand for labour (LD) function for a given level of demand for output. 
Notional demand for labour is denoted (LD). This is the amount of labour demanded, 
assuming that the product market is in equilibrium. Note that Patinkin does not employ 
these terms. 
Following Barro and Grossman (1971), a representative firm perceives that it is 
neither output- (i.e. sales-) nor labour-constrained, and maximizes profit (TI) given by 
N = Q S - W L D , (3) 
where Q and W denote the quantity of output and the real wage respectively, and the 
subscripts denote supply (S) and demand (D). 
Assuming a production function of the simple form, 
Q = F(L), (4) 
profit maximization is given by, 
dF LD = L(W), such that ̂  =W, 
which implies diminishing marginal productivity. Thus, the notional supply of output is 
a function of the notional demand for labour: QS = F(LD). This analysis is captured at 
point E in Diagram 2.4 which was also discussed in Section 2.1. There are no quantity 
constraints, hence labour and firms trade on their supply and demand curves, where 
perceived constraints are zero and are equal to actual constraints. In other words, in 
deriving a firm's demand for labour mathematically it is assumed that the firm can sell as 
much output it produces. 
In contrast, suppose that the firm is now output-constrained and cannot sell all of 
its notional supply (Qs). Then commodities in the product market are in excess supply, 
so that the actual sale of output (QD) (effective consumption demand) is less than notional 
demand (QD < QD» refer to diagram 2.3, part A). Hence, given (QD) the firm maximizes 
K (given by ABWi in diagram 2.4), by 
7C = QD - WLD 
subject to equation (4). The effective demand for labour becomes, 
LD = F- l (QD)for^> W. 
Since the product market is not in equilibrium the effective demand for labour (LD) will 
be less than the notional demand for labour (LD). 
The essence of Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis is that excess supply of output 
(QD < QD) causes excess supply of labour (LD < LD), and wages may now move pro-
cyclically with the trade cycle. Barro and Grossman (1971) start their scenario by 
supposing that product demand is too low (QD < QD). The consequence is excess supply 
of labour at point Z. The effective labour demand becomes ABLD ( Q ) . TO the extent 
that real wages respond to (LD < LD), real wages will fall towards W3, or point F. 
Suppose now that some policy action is taken to restore effective product demand, then a 
rising real wage will accompany a rise in employment and output, thus closing the gap 
fi-om ZE to GE. 
Within this analysis the concept of involuntary unemployment is no longer vague. 
In a Walrasian framework (where notional supply and demand is used) involuntary 
unemployment may only exist above W®, such as at W^. Keynesian involuntary 
unemployment can be captured by the gap BC. Yet, in another sense it is difficult to 
avoid the proposition that the gap BC constitutes voluntary unemployment, to the extent 
that the excessive real wage is the cause of unemployment and workers resist a decline in 
real wages. Even with Keynes' proposition, where workers' resistance to a lower 
money wage keeps the real wage high, the gap BC could be considered as voluntary 
unemployment. This vagueness is overcome since at point Z unemployment is uniquely 
due to variations in output: the real wage is unchanged. The real cause of unemployment 
is insufficient product demand. Stimulating output would reduce involuntary 
unemployment as illustrated by a shift from point Z to point G. 
The labour demand function, therefore, should have output explicitly as a right-
hand side variable. Involuntary unemployment is given by the gap ZE. If wages decline 
to W3 (point F) then involuntary unemployment is replaced by voluntary unemployment. 
Hughes and Perlman (1984, p68), make an important point that although Barro and 
Grossman (1971) "see the possibility of point F being attained, they do not argue that it 
will be an unstable real wage". A reduction in real wages does not decrease 
unemployment, but only changes its nature. A real wage in excess of W® is (in Barro 
and Grossman's words) a type of Neo-Classical involuntary unemployment. They state: 
"no stimulation of [product] demand could bring about full employment equilibrium, 
unless real wages were reduced" (Barro and Grossman, 1971, p87). In other words a 
reduction in real wages is not sufficient to generate full employment, as the economy may 
move from point B to point Z. This is Keynesian in the sense that product demand is 
insufficient; however, it is Neo-Classical to the extent that a necessary pre-requisite for 
effective stimulation of product demand is the reduction of the real wage overhang. 
Indecs (1986, p80) provides some indication that Australia may be experiencing Neo-
Classical involuntary unemployment. The authors state: "the near abolition of the 
overhang in 1980 brought only a minor fall in unemployment, and its complete abolition 
in 1984 still left unemployment at around 8 per cent of 1985, a long way above the pre-
overhang, full employment levels". Furthermore, Hanratty and Vipond (1982, p203), 
illustrate "how [NewJKeynesian and [Neo]-Classical unemployment can emerge at the 
same time... Demand expansion alone...could not produce full employment; real-wage 
cuts would also be required". 
Clower (1965) demonstrates that the Keynesian consumption function too is a 
consequence of trading in disequilibrium. Hey (1981, p203) makes the point that the 
"consumption function remains an essentially ad hoc construct"; and often the micro-
foundations are not specified. Analogously to Patinkin (1956, 1965), Glower (1965), 
presents the consumption function as a manifestation of disequilibrium in the labour 
market based on micro-foundations. Barro and Grossman (1971) demonstrate how a 
representative household maximizes utility given, that consumers are constrained in 
purchasing output and selling its labour. Income becomes exogenously determined. 
Gasson (1981, p34) remarks that, once it is recognized that trade occurs out of 
equilibrium, the exogeneity of income in the consumption function is the correct 
specification. "When money wages are too high households face a constraint on their 
supply of labour. As a result of this, income becomes exogenous to the household". In 
explaining Glower's (1965) position, Barro and Grossman (1971) make quantity-
constraints explicit, so that workers cannot sell as much labour time as they would like. 
The IS-LM and income-expenditure models recognize that excess labour has 
repercussions in the product market by entering realized (effective) income in the 
consumption function as a separate argument, but ignore the repercussions of excess 
output on the labour market by specifying labour demand as a function of real wages 
only. This not only explains the unrealistic countercyclical prediction of real wages, but 
as Hey (1981) points out, makes the IS-LM framework internally inconsistent; labour is 
constrained but firms are not constrained when effective income is less than notional 
income. Finally, within the IS-LM framework, if a rigid wage causes unemployment 
then a reduction in the real wage would cure unemployment. Keynes (1936) denied this 
conclusion yet, if real wages are flexible, involuntary unemployment should not arise. 
This inconsistency can be overcome if Keynes' (1936) theory is interpreted as a dynamic 
disequilibrium analysis where real wages may vary but rarely reach equilibrium. 
Kennedy (1979) and Wells (1977) voice a similar opinion. Kennedy (1979, p213) states 
that "Keynes treated a [position of less than full employment] as an equilibrium because it 
is a state of rest for the economy. Defining equilibrium not as a position of rest, but as a 
position in which all markets are cleared gives the alternative disequilibrium 
nomenclature". Moreover, Ackley (1961) supposes that "Keynes admitted some 
departure from the assumption of a completely rigid money wage" (Addison and Burton, 
1982, p5). Rees (1970, p308) also embraced the Keynesian notion that even with 
flexible wages aggregate demand would be further reduced if there was a general 
reduction in the worker's wage. Consequently, the decline in money wages which 
occurred during the great depression may not have cleared the labour market. This line of 
thought is developed in the following section. 
2 . 3 . 2 Dynamic Disequilibrium Theory and Kevnes 
This section will demonstrate that, within a dynamic disequilibrium framework 
and despite the removal of the assumption of rigid downward money wages, it is still 
possible to extract Keynesian propositions. In particular, unemployment is a function of 
output and a general reduction of money wages will not cure unemployment. At the same 
time it will be demonstrated that full employment equilibrium theories. Classical and Neo-
Keynesian (exemplified by the income-expenditure and IS-LM models), are not 
dissimilar. Only within a non-tatonnement framework does a clear distinction emerge. 
An interpretation present in the literature on disequilibrium economics is that 
disequilibrium theory may be seen as filling in the theoretical gaps of Neo-Keynesian 
models. Briefly, these models have accepted that labour is a derived demand and 
consumption (demand for output) is a function of effective (actual) income; they merely 
failed to elaborate on the underlying quantity-constrained maximization behaviour of 
economic agents. These micro-foundations have been addressed by Barro and Grossman 
(1971), Muellbauer and Portes (1978) and Hankapohja and Ito (1985). It is equally true, 
however, that non-tatonnement theory may render Neo-Keynesian (equilibrium) models, 
as voiced in Section 2.3.1, internally inconsistent, and that Walrasian theory is a unique 
case of non-tatonnement theory. 
The proposition that only within a non-tâtonnement framework does a clear 
distinction manifest between Classical theory and Keynes is developed by reference to 
Table 2.2, where Q, C, I and r denote respectively notional quantity, consumption, 
investment and the interest rate. The Neo-Keynesian and Classical theories are very 
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TABLE 2.2 
Comparison of Eauilihriiiin and Nnn-T^tnnngment Theories 
Walrasian (equilibrium) framcworic Non*tatonnexnent 
Classical(full) Neo-Keynesian (full New Keynesian employment theory employment) txxxiel (Unemployment) model 
Labour Ls = g(W) (1) Ls = g(W) (7) Ls = g(W) (13) 
market LD = g(W) (2) LD = g(W) (8) LB = g(Q) (14) 
L = Ls = Ld (3) L = Ls = LD (9) LD^LD (15) 
Product ( ^ = q(L) (4) (5s = q(L) (10) Qs = q(LB) (16) 
market QD = C(r) + I(r) (5) QD = C(Q)-Kl(r) (11) QD = C(Q)-^I(r) (17) 
Qs = QD= Q (6) (5S = QD= Q (12) Qs=(5D(QD'^QD)(18) 
Diagram 2J 
Constructed from above Table 2.2 
C(Q) I(r) 
C(r) + I(r) 
I(r) 
(I) 
Q.Q 
(in) 
0 , = q(L) 
a = q i ) 
Source: Adapted from Hairis, H. (1981), Monetary Theory, pp.153-161. 
similar (except for the consumption function) where equilibrium occurs when Q = Q and 
thus L = L. In other words, the notional supply of output (labour) equals the notional 
demand for output (labour). There are no quantity constraints; hence effective output 
(Q) equals notional output (Q), and all planned trades are realized. There are thus no 
involuntary inventories or unemployment; firms trade on their labour demand curves and 
workers trade on their supply curves simultaneously in equilibrium. Significantly, within 
the (Walrasian) equilibrium framework there is no clear distinction between Qassical and 
Neo-Keynesian labour markets. If one considers positions of involuntary 
(disequilibrium) unemployment, the system of equations needs to be altered. This 
alteration highlights the point that Walrasian theory is a unique case within the economics 
of disequilibrium. 
The production function, (4) and (10), is a special case of (16); the production 
function is a locus of effective output ^ and labour (L) , of which there is one unique 
point which constitutes full employment (i.e. L" = L). Consequently, the relevant demand 
for labour will be determined by the effective level of output (14). In a disequilibrium 
framework, (New)Keynesian steady-state equilibrium (SSE) occurs when effective output 
(Q) is less than notional (full employment) output (Q). SSE is defined (in (18)) as 
equality between effective supply of output (Qs) and effective demand for output (QD). 
Note that SSE in the labour market is determined by (New)Keynesian SSE in the product 
market. Walrasian equilibrium in the labour market is non-existent and according to 
Patinkin (1956, 1965) effective demand for labour (17) becomes a function of effective 
output Significantly, only within a non-tatonnement framework does one obtain a 
clear distinction between Keynesian and Neo-Classical propositions. 
This is more clear in the graphical analysis (Diagram 2.5), where point Z denotes a 
(New)Keynesian situation and point B describes a Neo-Classical situation; BZ captures 
Neo-Classical involuntary unemployment. In quadrant I (Walrasian) full employment is 
given by Q = Q", where notional output (Q) equals effective output ( Q). The broken line 
captures the Classical and Neo-Classical demand for output. It is vertical because 
QD (C +1) is determined by r only ( and r in turn is a function neither of (C +1) nor (Qs). 
When the aggregate demand curve intersects the 45° line at Ei, there exists excess notional 
supply equal to (Ei - F3). This is an unstable position and Say's Law (i.e. where saving 
and investment is equilibriated by r) ensures (Walrasian) full employment at Fi, 
(QD = QS = Q ) . 
In the (New)Keynesian scenario effective consumption is a function of effective 
income. They are considered to be effective aggregates, because they are a manifestation 
of quantity constraints. The consumption function is positive, reflecting a direct 
relationship between consumption and income. Position Hi reflects excess notional 
supply; however, since trade occurs out of equilibrium, effective demand QD (C + I) is 
less than notional demand, QD (C +1) . Following Patinkin (1956, 1965) both firms and 
workers move off their respective curves in the labour market: point Z. Position Fi is a 
unique position along a loci of disequilibrium points on the 45° line where QD = QD-
Point El is where effective demand, QD (C +1), is equal to effective supply (Qs). 
The graphical analysis, however, also highlights the tendency toward full 
employment. In order to extract Keynesian conclusions, that is, persistent disequilibrium 
unemployment, three special assumptions are required: (i) the liquidity trap; (ii) interest-
inelastic demand functions; and (iii) rigid money wages. Imposing these assumptions, 
however, in an attempt to contrast the Classical model and Keynes is unfortunate, as it 
renders (New)Keynesian theory similar to the Wakasian doctrine, in particular the full 
employment Neo-Keynesian model. If the analysis was not static, then within an 
equilbrium framework the labour market would adjust to point E2 and remove involuntary 
unemployment. These three assumptions, and in particular money wage rigidity, 
necessitate the Walrasian policy prescription for solving unemployment: a decrease in 
money wages. This Keynes denied. Moreover, Weintraub (1975, p540) makes the point 
that Keynes' investment demand function is interest-sensitive, "since the demand price of a 
capital good is, by the MEC schedule, inversely proportional to the interest rate, what 
Keynes argued is that an increase in the interest rate subsumed a fall in bond prices and 
thus, by substitutability, a fall in the quantity of capital assets demanded. Thus the 
investment demand schedule was interest-elastic". This is not the same as assumption (ii). 
Diagram 
Dynamic Analysis of Patinkin's Labour Market 
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NB: A pleasing result of this dynamic analysis is that a general reduction of money wages will not reduce the level of unemployment As Lekachman (1969» p75) states: "any observer at ail in touch with social reality of the 1930 s knew that quite hiequently wages and employment had contracted simultaneously". The proposition by Keynes is illustrated by reference to point B. While a real wage overhang is the cause of unemployment, a consequential reduction in the money wage will ooove the labour market to point Z. Since wages form a significant portion of aggrepte demand, firms become quantity-constrained. Lekachman (1969, p77) again explains: "when wages in general fall, then the demand for all varieties of consumer goods and services falls in tune with the declining incomes of workers. At best, then the demand for goods must fall in much the same proportion as wages... C^e employer can benfit from a reduction of his worker's wages [and therefore costs]. All workers cannot benefit by a general reduction. To believe otherwise is to commit a fallacy of composition." A Neo-Classical scenario is where tiie economy moves 
horn point B to position E because firms are not quantity-constndned; prices are flexible downwards. 
Indeed the liquidity trap does not appear to be a prevalent phenomenon. The distinction 
between Walrasian and Neo-Keynesian models is not clear. 
The imposition of these assumptions is required because of the nature of the 
framework: i.e. static (or comparative static) analysis. The assumptions are not required 
within a dynamic disequilibrium framework, where wages become endogenous and are 
allowed to be flexible but rarely, if ever, reaching equilibrium and thus preserving the 
existence of Keynesian involuntary (disequilibrium) unemployment. This process is 
illustrated in diagram 2.6. The implication to reduce involuntary unemployment is not to 
decrease the real wage by reducing the money wage, but rather to stimulate output. It has 
been argued that within a static disequilibrium framework, demand for output manifests 
itself in the labour demand function. Real wages did not enter the demand function 
because they were fixed, but became relevant in the Neo-Classical framework because they 
were endogenous. Within a dynamic disequilibrium framework both output and real 
wages are relevant. Real wages are now endogenous, but may not equilibriate the labour 
market; this leaves output as a relevant variable. 
This is demonstrated in the following diagram, (2.6). For ease of exposition 
assume that the price is constant atPo- Following Patinkin (1956,1965), involuntary 
unemployment is initially given by ZE. Assuming that the market dominates the wage 
determination process, then money wages (and in this example, real wages too) are forced 
down toward equilibrium. But as this occurs equilibrium may move from Ei to E2. A 
moving equilibrium is the essence of dynamic disequilibrium which is assumed to be a 
characteristic of the real world. The estimation procedure, developed in the following 
section, according to Bowden (1978a), assumes a moving equilibrium. Involuntary 
w o 
unemployment is now Z\Ei. In turn real wages are forced down to p ^ a n d involuntary 
unemployment is given by Z2E2. Involuntary unemployment has not been eliminated as 
would be the case in a Walrasian framework; if the reduction in the real wage is 
accompanied by an increase in aggregate demand, perhaps due to a decrease in product 
price, then involuntary unemployment would be reduced as point Z2 approaches E2. 
Sinclair (1987, p68) states: "(New)Keynesian unemployment can be removed by bringing 
the price of goods down to its Walrasian level, and correcting the money wage rate if it has 
also strayed [from equilibrium]". In essence, therefore, involuntary unemployment may 
exist when wages (both money and real) are flexible. In a pure equilibrium framework real 
wages enter the labour demand equation, while in a fixed-wage disequilibrium regime 
output enters the demand equation. When both output and wages are allowed to vary, both 
wages and output enter the demand equation only within a dynamic disequilibrium 
framework. The distinction between (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical scenarios is 
therefore a matter of degree; the relative speeds of wages and employment toward 
equilibrium are the criteria for distinguishing between these doctrines. 
As previously explained, however, dynamics implies non-optimizing behaviour, 
and as Hey (1981) remarks, dynamic models require a departure from optimality (i.e. 
choice-theory). As a consequence models become behavioural and are based on 
reasonable rules of behaviour. From this perspective, a price equation of the form 
[Pt - Pt-i = f(D - S)] as used by Fair and Jaffee (1971) may be an appropriate appendage to 
their market model. The thinking behind the equation is simple; if there is excess supply 
price will tend to fall, and vice-versa. (As pointed out in Section 2.2, using the above 
price equation in conjunction with the short side rule is inconsistent). 
On the other hand, optimality (choice-theory) is not forsaken when a price equation 
takes the form of the Partial Adjustment Model (PAM). According to Griliches (1967) the 
basic premise of the PAM is that there are costs to adjustment which justify the observed 
inertia or sluggishness of endogenous variables, such as employment. The PAM provides 
a basis for optimal-adjustment theory. Following Griliches (1967), firms incur two costs: 
(i) the cost of trading in disequilibrium (i.e. forgone profit) and (ii) the cost of change 
(adjustment). It is not costless, for example, for a firm to adjust its labour stock to 
variations in product demand; output therefore may vary more than employment. If both 
cost functions are approximated by quadratics, then the loss function becomes 
L = a(St-Set)2 + b(St-St.i)2 
where S®t is the desired equilibrium level. Minimizing L by differentiating with respect to 
St and setting to zero gives: 
dL a s = 2a(St - S^t) + 2b(St - S n ) = 0 
^ St = + (St-l) 
St - St-l = ^ (Set-St.i) 
St-St-l = mCSet - St-l) 
where m = This states that the higher the adjustment cost the slower the rate of 
adjustment. Of course, there are other reasons why complete adjustment is not achieved 
in a single period, such as economic and social institutions (including the conjectural 
theory as explained in section 2.2), persistence of habit, and poor information flows. 
Consequently, in this thesis an economic technique with partial adjustment toward 
a moving equilibrium is adopted; a partial adjustment equation will replace the equilibrium 
condition in the labour market (i.e. LS = LD). Both L and W will adjust toward 
equilibrium, but only partially. This technique has been developed by Chow (1983). 
The Chow (1983) procedure has the advantage of avoiding the use of the short-side rule. 
The short-side rule implies an unusual asymmetric adjustment. The rule suggests that 
effective labour demand (X") overshoots the new equilibrium during and economic 
downturn (Sarantis, 1981, cited in Rao, 1983), but does not overshoot equilibrium 
during an economic upturn. Suppose, as in Diagram 2.7, the labour demand function 
shifts to L^D, then adjustment as dictated by the short-side rule may be from point A to 
point C. Employment does not overshoot the new equilibrium (J) during an 
expansionary adjustment phase. In contrast, as the labour demand function shifts to Ld^ 
effective labour demand overshoots the new equilibrium (G) because employment settles 
at X i , point A. Other short-comings of this rule have been addressed in previous 
sections. 
If the labour market as dictated by the short-side rule was initially at point C and 
labour demand shifted to L^D, the short-side rule again dictates that employment will fall 
to Li (point A). This highlights other assumptions underlying the adjustment to point A. 
Diagram 2.7 
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Adjustment of employment by a firm to point A assumes little or no cost to the firm in 
adjusting its labour stock, and that firms are not sales-constrained (since point A is on the 
firm's labour demand function). 
If there are significant costs to the firm to retrench and re-hire labour, however, 
then labour may be less sensitive to variations in the demand for output. Firms, 
therefore, may hoard labour during an economic downtum if they expect the downturn to 
be temporary. Consequently, a firm may not adjust its labour stock to Li (point A), but 
to somewhere in between such as point E; the firm is off its labour demand function. 
Adjustment to point A assumes that the firm is not quantity-constrained and there are litde 
costs to the firm in reducing labour. Furthermore, adjustment to point E (and A) also 
assumes no real wage adjustment; if real wages are flexible downwards, since the 
effective demand for labour (L2 at point E) is less than the notional demand for labour (L3 
at point G), then adjustment will lie somewhere between points E and H. Point F implies 
unconstrained behaviour and point H depicts voluntary unemployment, but this is 
probably an unstable situation. Any adjustment of labour by firms that does not extend to 
Li implies some degree of labour hoarding, which may be defined as the 
deliberate under-utilization of a firm's labour stock because it may retain more labour than 
is required to produce a given level of output. In short, assuming: (i) firms are quantity-
constrained and therefore operate off their labour demand functions (Patinkin, 1956, 
1965); (ii) there are significant costs to firms to adjust their labour stocks; and, (iii) real 
wages are flexible; adjustment may be from Z to Z\ or somewhere in between. 
Therefore, embodied in a partial adjustment equation, unlike the short-side rule, is 
Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis and the theory of labour hoarding. An econometric 
procedure that employs the partial adjustment equation and discards the short-side rule is 
theoretically desirable. The Chow (1983) method also provides a method of measuring 
the relative speeds of adjustment of employment and wages toward equilibrium. In 
summarizing, Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian labour market theories are both 
characterized by non-tatonnement; disequilibrium in tum implies dynamics and therefore 
the adjustment of the endogenous variables. The distinction between Neo-Classical and 
(New)Keynesian economics is a matter of degree. If the real wage adjusts all but 
instantaneously during a disequilibrium phase, then the labour market may be 
characterized by a Neo-Classical framework. Underlying a Neo-Classical framework is, 
perhaps, labour hoarding, since employment is not a significant source of adjustment 
toward equilibrium. Labour dis-hoarding may allow employment to adjust more rapidly 
than the price of labour. The econometrics of disequilibrium and Chow's (1983) 
procedure is discussed in detail in 2.4. Section 2.5, in summarizing this chapter, also 
discusses labour hoarding in relation to Chow's (1983) estimation technique. 
2.4 NON-TÂTONNEMENT ESTIMATION PROCEDURES 
The significance of non-tâtonnement economics for estimation is that it will 
determine the structure, specification and estimation procedure of a model. Econometric 
models revolve around the multi-equation or single-equation framework, which reflect 
the equilibriating nature of right-hand side variables (i.e. endogeneity of some variables 
in a multi-equation framework) or the exogeneity of the right-hand side variables in a 
single-equation framework. 
Trivedi and Baker (1985) criticize the estimation of the expectations augmented 
Phillips curve of the form: 
Pj = (Ut-U^O + aPt* (1) 
where Pt and Pt* denote respectively actual and expected price changes and Ut and U®t 
denote actual unemployment and the Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRU)."̂  Briefly, 
the NRU is given by the intersection of supply and demand curves in the labour market; 
more precisely the point of intersection of the traditional Phillips curve with the 
unemployment axis where the rate of price inflation is zero. This may be viewed as a 
unique case of the Non-Accelerating Inflationary Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), 
where a positive (but constant) rate of price inflation is associated with equilibrium in the 
7 Note that Trivedi and Baker (1985) refrained from using the term NRU as defined by Friedman, 
because of what they see as vagueness and ambiguities in his defmition. 
labour market. Positive non-constant price inflation exists when Ut diverges from U®t; 
thus the term (Ut - U®t) is a surrogate for aggregate demand. 
Trivedi and Baker (1985, p630-31) make the point that "since U®t is a general 
equilibrium concept its solution values ought to be derived from the solution of an 
economy wide model in which the expectations-augmented Phillips curve is embedded. 
[Moreover], market clearing assumptions...[make]...results either uninteresting or not 
meaningful when one wants to obtain the time path of unemployment given sluggish 
wage-price adjustment and 'continuous' non-marketing clearing". 
Assuming the short-side rule, Trivedi and Baker (1985) proceed to estimate a 
short-run (cyclical) unemployment (U^) equation of the general form^ 
UC = S, T) (2) 
W Q where S and T denote search and structural unemployment respectively. — and — 
capture real wage and output (insufficient aggregate demand) gaps, where e denotes 
equilibrium values, and W and Q denote observed values. Since W® and Q® are 
unobservable within a disequilibrium framework, measurement difficulties arise. This 
difficulty is avoided with the Chow (1983) technique which will be developed in the 
following section. The estimation of U® is consistent with Trivedi's and Baker's (1985) 
objective of measuring cyclical unemployment, which is defined as "the rate of 
unemployment that would prevail given short-run rigidity of the real wage" (Trivedi and 
Baker, 1982, pi). The implied framework is static disequilibrium (i.e. SSE). Their 
objective is to explain short-run variations in U®. They point out that if real wage and 
demand variables are sluggish in adjustment then the single equation (as above), which 
implies exogeneity of right-hand side variables, will yield a fruitful explanation of short-
run unemployment. If the real wage and demand (output) variables, however, were 
treated as endogenous in a Wakasian spirit, additional equations would be required to 
investigate unemployment fully. 
Note that this is a simplified version of their equation. 
In the long-run, unlike the short-run, it is reasonable to suppose that real wages 
and aggregate demand variables are endogenous. Yet an estimation technique that 
proceeds with these assumptions implies that equilibrium is the assumed state. 
Keynesian theory is not easily tested within such a framework. 
As previously argued, however, it is a conceivable and even an accurate 
interpretation of Keynes, that markets (prices and real wages) do respond to supply and 
demand in the long-run, but that equilibrium is rarely achieved or that disequilibrium is 
more the rule than the exception. Lagged endogenous variables may accommodate the 
sluggish adjustment of markets, but the procedure assumes that Walrasian equilibrium is 
achieved, albeit in a sluggish manner. This procedure in itself suggests trade out of 
equilibrium. Real wages may be sluggish in their adjustment because of poor 
informational flows (exemplified by search behaviour), economic and social institutions. 
Empirical models that support the sluggish nature of wage and employment adjustment in 
the labour market are Lewis and Makepeace (1981, 1984), Smyth (1983) for the U.K., 
and both Jonson, Battellino and Campbell (1978) and Lewis and Makepeace (1985) for 
Australia. 
A basic model of the labour market in disequilibrium is specified below^: 
BASIC MODEL 
QD = d(Pt, X^t) + e o (3) 
Q s = S(Pt, XSt) + es (4) 
Pt-Pt-i =f(QD-Qs) + ep (5) 
Qt = min (D,S) (6) 
where: 
D,S = Notional demand and supply for Q (unobserved). 
Pt» Qt = Observed price and quantity in current time period. 
X^t» XSj = Exogoneous demand and supply variables respectively. 
CD» es, Cp = Error terms with Normal Classical assumptions. 
9 The symbols P and Q are used here in a general sense, so that P may refer to W, and Q may refer to L. 
Without equation (5), price is assumed to be exogenous. This basic model where 
adjustment is free of error (ep = 0) was first estimated by Fair and Jaffee (1972). 
Equations (5) and (6) have been discussed in Section 2.2. According to Fair and Jaffee 
(1972, p497) "the main problem of estimation is that in the absence of an equilibrium 
condition the observed quantity traded in the market may not satisfy both the supply and 
demand schedule" (i.e. Qe ^̂  QD ^̂  Qs)- Fair and Jaffee (1972) applied the maximum 
Likelihood Method (MLM) to their model, as it was appropriate in determining the 
optimal apportionment of a sample of observations into demand and supply regimes. 
Since this path-breaking article, subsequent literature which extends and modifies 
Fair's and Jaffee's (1972) basic model has evolved. Fair and Kelejian (1974, pl77) state 
that the price-adjustment equation embodies a "rather strict assumption about price setting 
behaviour, namely that price changes are strictly proportional to excess demand". 
Consequently, the error term (ep) was included. Also the price-adjustment equation can 
be generalized into a multivariate equation. Fair and Kelejian (1974) investigated the 
following equation: 
Pt -Pt - l=f(QD-Qs) + XP + ep (7) 
where X^ is a cost variable. This is realistic since, in oligopoly theory, prices respond to 
unit normal cost, which is affected by excess demand. Analogously, a wage-adjustment 
equation may be augmented by a price variable. The inclusion of the error term (ep) 
makes MLM complicated, and possibly irregular and unbounded for certain combinations 
of the parameter values^o. This shortcoming has been echoed by Maddala and Nelson 
(1974), Rao (1983) and Bowden (1978a). 
Bowden (1978a) respecifies this basic model and allows for an investigation into 
the problem of testing a model for equilibrium or disequilibrium. Equilibrium in the basic 
model corresponds to f = infinity since f may assume any value other than zero, but 
adjustment becomes non-operational when f = zero. This implies that various degrees of 
equilibrium are described between zero and infinity. There is, therefore, no statistical test 
10 See Chow (1983) for proof of this, p244-246 
for degrees of disequilibrium, since there are no upper or lower boundaries. In other 
words the value that f takes on, when estimated, is not bounded. Bowden's (1978a) 
reformulation of equation (5) allows for a measure of drag, m, otherwise known as the 
coefficient of friction. Briefly, Bowden (1978a) introduces an unobservable price 
variable (P^t) in place of Pt in the supply and demand equations. P®t is the unobservable 
equilibrium price. It is the market clearing price. Equation (5) is reformulated as: 
Ft = mPt-i + (l-m)pet + ep (8) 
where (Pt - Pt-i) is the actual adjustment and (P®t - Pt-l) is the required adjustment to 
equilibriate the market. Bowden (1978a, p93) describes equation (8) as a partial moving 
equilibrium model (PAMEQ). "Prices adjust each period partially to the moving 
equilibrium (Bowden, 1978a, p83). For the market to be in continuous 
equilibrium, then Ft = P̂ t- In terms of the coefficient of drag, when m = 0, the limiting 
case of instantaneous adjustment occurs. When m = 1 there is no response by the 
market. The model is now bounded, or in other words, has defined limits ranging from 
zero to unity. If 0 < m < 1, only a proportion of any difference between actual and 
desired balances is made up within any one time period. 
Smyth (1983) estimates Bowden's PAMEQ model for the U.K. for the period 
1920 - 1938. An unemployment variable was included in the supply equation which, 
according to Smyth (1983), is in accordance with the Neo-Classical doctrine. This is the 
same estimation period used by Benjamin and Kochin (1979), who argue that 
unemployment benefits significantly raised unemployment levels in the U.K. Smyth 
(1983) used the MLM (although Bowden's model can be adapted to accommodate other 
estimation procedures^!). He found that by imposing the constraint m = 0, the 
constrained equilibrium version was rejected in favour of a disequilibrium framework. 
Furthermore, Lewis and Makepeace (1984) rejected the hypothesis that the British labour 
11 See Bowden (1978) for an overview of various disequilibrium estimation tecluiiques. Note that 
Bowden's generalized adjusunent procedure is similar to Chow's (1983) technique. 
market has been in equilibrium. Interestingly, Smyth (1983) confirmed Benjamin's and 
Kochin's (1979) conclusion, and further concluded that a reduction of unemployment 
benefits by about half (during the period 1925-1938) would have increased employment 
by between 8% and 12%. 
The analysis thus far has been concerned with one market in disequilibrium. Ito 
(1980) presents a multi-market model in which spillover effects of excess demand or 
supply in one market affect another market He presents a model with labour and output 
markets, and demonstrates various estimation procedures (MLM, two-stage least 
squares) reflecting different pricing schemes. 
Common to all models was the assumption of the short-side rule: Q = min (D,S). 
This rule, as briefly touched upon, has some theoretical shortcomings, since it implies 
that there is no problem in information flows and this is not a characteristic of labour 
markets where there exists search unemployment due to poor information flows. The 
rule is appropriate only where prices (wages) are fixed institutionally; that is, where 
prices and wages are not endogenous. Models with price-adjustment equations and the 
short-side rule therefore represent an odd mix, although they have met with some 
empirical success. As explained in section 2.2, using a price equation in conjuction with 
equation (6) is inconsistent. Another shortcoming is that it does not allow for both price 
and quantity adjustment. This is unfortunate, since the main focus of (dynamic) 
disequilibrium economics is that quantities are a significant source of adjustment. An 
estimation procedure where both price and quantities are endogenously determined 
(allowed to adjust) is desirable, since their relative speed of adjustment may be measured. 
Chow (1983, p246) states: "if price and other economic variables are allowed to 
adjust toward an equilibrium specified by a set of simultaneous equations one can choose 
the following model": 
AY^t + BXt = E (9) 
Yt - Yt-i = M(Yh . Yt-i) (10) 
where 
Y®t = Vector of unobserved current endogenous equilibrium variables. 
Yt = Vector of observed endogenous variable in current time period. 
Xt = Vector of observed exogenous variables in current time period. 
A,B,M = Matrices of coefficients. 
E = Error terms with Normal Classical assumptions. 
The equilibrium values are unobserved because, like Bowden's PAMEQ, the 
equilibrium is moving. Since the system has two equations and one unknown (Y® 0» it 
can be algebraically manipulated for estimation purposes, so that all variables are 
observable. Solving for Y®t in (9) allows for a substitution with (10) which conveniently 
removes the unknown. Equation (9) becomes: 
Y^t = A-l(-BXt + E) 
and after expanding: 
Y t̂ = -BA-lXt + A-lE (11) 
Substituting 11 into 10 yields: 
Yt - Yt-i = M(-BA-lXt+ A-lE - Yn) , 
which can be solved now for Yt, as this is the usual position for a current endogenous 
variable in regression: 
Yt = -BA-lMXt + MA-lE - MYt-i + Yt-i 
Factorizing gives: 
Yt = -BA-lMXt + a-M)Yt.i + MA-lE (12a) 
Yt = ZiYt-i + Z2Xt+e (12b) 
where 
Zi = a-M) 
Z2 = -BA-lM 
e = MA-lE 
The estimation procedure revolves around (11), (12) and (9). It is assumed that 
M, the adjustment matrix, is diagonal and some of its elements are unity. The first step in 
the estimation procedure is to apply ordinary least squares (O.L.S) to obtain Z\ and Z2. 
These estimates are used to generate (that is, forecast within the sample period) estimates 
of Y®t through (11). In forecasting, the error term is assumed to be zero (A-^E = 0). The 
estimated observations of Y®t are then used in (9) to run an appropriate regression 
technique: OLS, 2SLS, or three stage least squares (3SLS). The estimates of -B and A-l 
are, as noted by Chow (1983), consistent Chow (1983) further remarks that Y®t itself in 
equation (10) may be lagged and M may be specified with other variables. However, 
Chow (1977), cited in Rao (1983), notes that lagged endogenous variables in (9) may 
render (M) unidentifiable, but these lags are unnecessary because the functional form of 
equation (10) is that of the 'partial adjustment model' (P.A.M.), which captures the 
sluggish nature of price and quantity adjustments. 
The advantage of Chow's (1983) procedure over Bowden's (1978a) and other 
procedures is that the short-side rule is not employed, that is, quantities and prices are 
both a source of adjustment. Moreover, underlying the P.A.M equation, as developed by 
Griliches (1967), is a choice-theoretic foundation of optimizing behaviour by economic 
agents in a dynamic disequilibrium framework. Furthermore, since the short-side rule 
has been discarded, it can be assumed that firms may be quantity-constrained which is 
consistent with non-tâtonnement, because contrary to the implications of the short-side 
rule, firms may not operate on their labour demand curves. Finally, partial adjustment 
also implies the theory of labour hoarding; the short-side rule implies that there are no 
costs to the firm when it alters its stock of labour. 
2 . 5 rAROIIR HOARDTNG AND PARTTAT. AD.TUSTMENT 
Historically, employment has varied less than output over the trade cycle, so that 
labour productivity is high during output peaks and low during troughs. Labour 
productivity tends to fall, (i.e. exhibit diminishing returns), during a downswing of the 
business cycle and rise, (i.e. exhibit increasing retums), in an upswing. That is, labour 
productivity moves pro-cyclically over the trade cycle. This contradicts the theoretically-
expected result of diminishing retums during an upswing. As firms, during an upswing. 
add (employ) more labour to a fixed capital stock, labour productivity is expected to 
decline (i.e. exhibit decreasing returns). 
The presence of (fixed) adjustment costs of hiring and displacing labour provides 
a partial buffer to labour adjustment following an economic downturn. A firm need not 
adjust labour immediately following a decline in the marginal value product of labour 
consequent on a decline in sales (or product demand). The firm will wait to consider if 
the downtum is permanent before it displaces labour. If the downturn was temporary 
and labour was laid-off, then the firm will again have to incur the fixed costs involved in 
re-hiring and training labour. This solves the apparent puzzle of increasing returns to 
labour in an upswing. During downturns the adjustment costs of labour slow or even 
prevent labour displacement, thus lowering labour productivity. In the upswing, firms 
utilize unused labour time, thus raising labour productivity; consequently, labour 
productivity moves pro-cyclically over the trade cycle. 
One of the early attempts to accommodate adjustment costs in a short-run demand 
for labour was that of Brechling (1965) where: 
N t̂ = f(Qt) (1) 
and 
Nt-Nt-i = XiN^f Nt-i) (2) 
N®t is desired or equilibrium employment, and Nt adjusts according to equation (2); Qt 
denotes current output. As N®t is unobserved, (1) is substituted into (2) to yield: 
Nt - Nt-i = X m d - Nt-i) (3a) 
Nt = A.f(Qt) + (1 - >.)Nt-i (3b) 
The sluggish nature of adjustment is given by (1 - Xy^, Adjustment is instantaneous if 
X =1 . Note, however, that the model does not allow explicitly for a labour supply 
12 The coefficients of f(Qi) can be obtained via estimates of (1 - A.) and X 
equation. This highlights a further advantage of Chow's (1983) generalized technique. 
Specifying a supply equation is desirable, especially in the long-run. The specification of 
a supply function will be more apparent in Chapter 3. 
Also the Chow (1983) technique of estimating markets in (dynamic) 
disequilibrium was found to embrace optimal-adjustment paths (Griliches, 1967), labour 
hoarding (where M captures the speed of adjustment) and Patinkin's (1956, 1965) 
analysis. The implicit assumption of price and quantity adjustment during a 
disequilibrium phase also avoids the use of the short-side trading rule, which was found 
to have a number of shortcomings. The technique further avoids the specification of 
effective supply and demand curves, and consequentiy the problems of making spillover 
effects explicit. 
To specify a model using effective labour supply and demand functions requires 
reformulating a firm's production function and budget constraint so that the firm cannot 
sell all the output it desires; firms are constrained in the output market. Difficulties in 
selling output in the product market will spill over into the labour market as a reduction in 
the demand for labour. Specifying these spillover effects becomes theoretically and 
econometrically cumbersome; the form of the spillover is the subject of considerable 
debate. For a rigorous discussion on spillover effects and estimation see Honkapohja 
and Ito(1985). 
In adopting the partial adjustment equation, it is assumed that M, the speed of 
adjustment coefficient for wages and employment, is constant and is not influenced by 
the direction or movement of the economy. This in turn implies symmetric adjustment 
for both wages and employment by firms. Symmetric adjustment of labour by firms is 
where the rate the firms adjustment of labour is the same for an economic upturn (hiring) 
as it is for an economic downturn (lay-offs). Asymmetric adjustment, for example, is 
where the rate of employment is adjusted more during an economic upturn than in a 
downturn. 
Assuming that the cost of adjusting labour is dependent on the state of the labour 
market, the speed of adjusting labour by firms should vary over the business cycle. In 
this procedure, however, M is a constant coefficient and, thus the estimated value that M 
takes on will not change over the business cycle. In the case of an economic downturn, 
firms experience increasing adjustment costs by laying off labour, then downward 
adjustment of labour would slow down when unemployment is higher. This implies that 
M, with respect to employment, should not be constant or that the speed of adjustment 
need not be symmetric. 
If labour recruitment and lay-offs are somehow a function of labour market 
tightness, then the adjustment coefficient M should be made a function of such tightness 
in the labour market; the unemployment rate, as cited in the literature on disequilibrium, is 
a natural candidate to represent such tightness. Variation in unemployment, however, 
may not capture such tightness if variation in unemployment is primarily due to changes 
in \J% the natural rate of unemployment. As Chow (1983) points out, M can be made a 
function of other variables and hence will no longer be a constant. 
Hazeldine (1979), Briscoe and Peel (1975), Thomas and Deaton (1977), and 
Muellbauer (1978) all suggest the presence of an asymmetric labour adjustment over the 
business cycle. Earlier studies, such as Hawkins (1971) and Fair (1969), made their 
adjustment coefficient (X in equation 2) a function of the unemployment rate in an attempt 
to capture asymmetric adjustment of labour by firms (cited in Hazeldine, 1979). 
Hazeldine (1979) remarks, however, that there is no clear evidence, especially for 
Canadian manufacturing as a whole, of asymmetric labour adjustment. What is 
important, however, is that the partial adjustment equation accounts for the apparent 
contradiction of theory with observed reality. The form of Chow's (1983) partial 
adjustment equation is the same as Griliche's (1967) and Brechling's (1965) partial 
adjustment equation for employment. Chow's (1983) is a generalized partial adjustment 
equation; this becomes more apparent by expanding the endogenous vectors Yt and Y®t 
for a labour market: 
Nt - Nt-i = biiWt - Nt-i) (4a) 
Wt - Wt-i = ai(Wet - Wt-i) (4b) 
Since both endogenous variables as dictated by equation 10 in the previous section are 
allowed to adjust during the disequilibrium phase, (4) becomes: 
Nt - Nt-i = biCN t̂ - Nt-i) + b2(Wet-Wt.i) (5a) 
Wt - Wt-i = aiCW^t- Wt-i) + a a m - Nt-i) (5b) 
The coefficient M implies symmetric adjustment of the real wage; if the real wage 
is rigid downwards then this is an inappropriate assumption. The Patinkin (1956,1965) 
analysis, however, allows for a downward adjustment of the real wage; although 
downward adjustment may well be slower than upward adjustment. The PAM equation, 
and its implied assumption of symmetric adjustment, is thought to be theoretically 
adequate, since it overcomes an inconsistency of theory with reality and there is no 
overwhelming evidence of asymmetric labour adjustment for manufacturing as a whole. 
From a Classical perspective Qt should be replaced with real wages Wt but as 
Hazeldine (1979, p l l ) points out, "it seems to be just not possible to get good fits 
without including a quantity demand variable" in the demand function. Indeed, this may 
be a manifestation of disequilibrium, since in disequilibrium output becomes an explicit 
variable that at least partly explains unemployment. Symons and Layard (1984, p788) 
suggest that "if product markets are competitive and firms operate on their demand 
curves, employment should be explained by real factor prices (relative to product prices), 
the capital stock and the state of technology". With classical assumptions, output would 
not enter the labour demand function explicitly while real wages would. Output in the 
product market, in other words, is never constrained, in that firms can sell as much as 
they produce. Within a (New)Keynesian framework, however, firms may not operate on 
their labour demand curve; they may be quantity- constrained. Thus, in following 
Patinkin (1956, 1965), output also becomes an explicit variable. A long-run labour 
demand function (where wages are not fixed) will have as explicit variables, both output 
and real wages. Briefly, with (New)Keynesian theory, unlike Neo-Classical, less than 
full employment will occur without institutional rigidities. 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that within a Walrasian framework Neo-
Classical and Neo-Keynesian doctrines are very similar; in particular there is no clear 
distinction between the theories if wages are allowed to be flexible. Indeed, within the 
(New)Keynesian theory a reduction in the real wage does not necessarily cure 
involuntary unemployment, but it does in a Walrasian framework; (i.e. both Neo-
classical and Neo-Keynesian). The superficial distinction between Neo-Classical and 
Neo-Keynesian theories has been maintained by making the assumption, among others, 
of rigid money wages. Indeed this assumption can also be perceived as Neo-Classical in 
character. Using Chow's (1983) disequilibrium procedure to estimate Neo-Keynesian 
unemployment would be inappropriate, because the wage rate, an endogenous variable, 
is assumed to be rigid. 
A disequilibrium framework, and hence Chow's (1983) procedure, embraces 
both (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical theories. Importantly, within a dynamic 
disequilibrium framework, where wages are endogenous and therefore considered 
flexible, a distinction between Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian theories still emerges. 
Since both theories (as argued here) are a manifestation of disequilibrium they can be 
placed on a continuum where both prices and quantities adjust to equilibrium, particularly 
in the long run. At one extreme where quantities (labour) may adjust more rapidly than 
prices (wages) we have a (New)Keynesian phenomenon. At the other end of the 
continuum where prices react more rapidly than quantities, we have a Neo-Classical 
scenario. The paper now turns to specifying and estimating an unemployment model 
using Chow's (1983) generalized partial adjustment technique. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE MODEL: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 
3 . 1 THE MODEL SPFrTFTFD 
The model presented below revolves around five equations. Equation (5), which 
is Chow's (1983) generalized model, has been extensively developed in previous 
sections. The unemployment equation (1) is placed in a system of equations because 
wages are assumed to be endogenous. Involuntary unemployment stems from a labour 
market in disequilibrium; hence N®t and W®t are assumed unobservable in equations (3) 
and (4), which together comprise the labour market. Equation (3) provides the link 
between the labour market and unemployment. The assumption is that W®t will influence 
Wt, but not to the extent where W®t = Wt. Otherwise N% from a Classical perspective, 
will be observable and unemployment will be all voluntary. 
1: The unemployment equation 
Ut = u(Wt,Qt,St,Tt) + Et 
2: The wage equation 
Wt = w(AWt, W S Ft, Ut, Bt) + Et 
3: The labour demand function 
Net = d(Wet,Qt,Kt) + Et 
4: The labour supply equation 
N^t = sCW t̂, Lt, Ut) + Et 
5: The system is closed bv 
Yt-Yt-i = M(Yet-Yt.i), 
where 
Kt = Capital stock. 
Pt = C.P.I. (100 = 80/81.) 
W®t = Unobserved equilibrium real wage. 
Wt = Observed (actual) disequilibrium real wage. 
Ut = Observed unemployment - persons (000s). 
Nt = Estimated disequilibrium employment (000s). 
N®t = Unobserved equilibrium employment. 
Qt = Observed real output (G.D.P. $mill., 1979/80 - average prices). 
Bt = Real unemployment benefits (single adult male without dependents, 
deflated by Pt, 100 = 80/81) 
St = Search unemployment variable. Defined as B J / W L 
Tt = Demand dispersion/structural unemployment variable. 
Lt = Labour Force, persons aged 15 years and over. 
AWt = Real award wage index. Deflated by Pt, 100 = 80/81. 
Et = Error terms with Normal Classical assumptions. 
The above model was estimated over two time periods to provide a comparison 
between these two periods. Period I (PI) is the first quarter of 1964(1) to the third 
quarter of 1972(3). Period II (PII) covers the fourth quarter of 1972(4) to the second 
quarter in 1986(2). The decision to end the first period at 1972(3) is based on the fact 
that the classifications of industries changed in 1972(4). Consequently, since the variable 
Tt requires employment statistics from various industries, the index Tt was constructed 
over the two separate periods as mentioned above. This is not unfortunate, because 
unemployment became more volatile after the early 1970s. An introductory discussion of 
each equation for both periods is presented below. 
3 . 1 . 1 The Unemplnvmpni Equation: Ut = u(Wt,Qt, St, Tt) + Et. 
The equation, while of a simpler form, is in keeping with Trivedi and Baker 
(1982, 1985). St is the ratio of Bt and Wt: the higher the ratio the larger will be the 
number of persons searching for work. Then a priori, the sign on St may be expected to 
alter between periods. 
Friedman's model of ftictional unemployment incorrecúy predicts that the quit rate 
falls during a boom and rises during a recession (Kennedy, 1979). A job search scenario 
becomes more credible if, in the short-run, job search activity tends to rise when 
unemployment is low. This is depicted in Diagram 3.1, where Ut and SAt denote the 
unemployment rate and search activity respectively, and SU is the search-unemployment 
curve which embodies the inverse relationship between SAt and Ut. The inverse 
relationship is consistent with the concept of full employment-unemployment. That is, 
search unemployment is a constraint upon achieving 100% employment. The a priori 
sign on SAt, however, needs careful consideration. While there exists a negative 
relationship between Ut and St, there is a positive relationship between St and SAt. 
Consequently, there exists a negative relationship between St (which is the cost of SAt) 
and Ut. Assuming that Bt has declined (relative to Wt), which most certainly occurred 
during the first period, then the coefficient on St may have a positive sign. However, if 
Bt has risen (relative to Wt), which is thought to be the situation in the second period, 
then St may yield a negative sign. 
More will be said about Bt in relation to the wage equation, but for the moment a 
reversal of signs on St will be assumed to indicate a change in search behaviour. A 
positive sign (expected) on PI suggests that SAt is at or close to its irreducible minimum 
(since Bt is expected to be small or insignificant relative to Wt). A negative St (expected) 
in Pn will suggest an increase in search activity. 
Traditionally, search unemployment is considered as non-demand deficient 
unemployment^. The other non-demand deficient unemployment considered is structural 
unemployment; specified as Tt. The Tt index is constructed from the following formulae: 
D 
Tt = Z INit - Ntl (W) Ñt = Ñit 
i=l .NtJ ^^"iNt, 
This is not strictly true. All types of unemployment are affected by demand factors. 
Diagram 3.1 
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and the subscript t denotes current time period. Nt is total employment in D industries 
—jr 
and Nit is employment in industry i. The dot refers to the rate of change, while N t 
denotes the weighted average rate of change of employment for all industries. As 
Stoikov (1966, p54) says the index (TO "is a measure of demand dispersion that occurs 
from [time period to time period]. If there were not relative shifts in demand for labour 
between industries then individual deviations from the all-industry average rate of change 
of employment would be zero. The greater the relative shifts of demand the larger the 
index. The individual deviations [of labour demand] from the average rate of change are 
weighted by the relative employment of the industry in question in order to take account 
of industries with different employment volumes". 
The index attempts to capture a mismatch in labour skills demanded and supplied. 
In Australia, where there exist distinct segmented labour markets, changes in the cyclical 
demand for labour will lead to a divergence in the supply and demand of labour skills. 
This assumes that there exists: 
i) costly and imperfect labour mobility between industries and geographic 
regions; 
ii) changes in the composition of consumer demand and technology 
(manifested as a change in the nature of capital), and hence also in the 
composition of production; and 
iii) regional shifts of both industry and labour (i.e. in both labour supply and 
demand). 
Technology has been singled out as the underlying cause of the divergence 
between the demand for and supply of labour skills. In the short-run, holding all other 
factors constant, the adoption of new technology may lead to a mismatch of labour skills 
demanded and supplied. In the long-run, however, if the economy is expanding and 
efficient in adjusting resources quickly when supply and demand shifts, then it is less 
certain that a divergence between labour skills demanded and supplied will cause 
persistent unemployment Specifically, whether Tt shows up as a significant explanation 
of Ut will depend on the output and substitution effects of replacing labour with capital; 
in the short-run and for a particular industry the adoption of labour-saving capital will 
reduce employment, assuming that output has not risen to compensate for the substitution 
effect of labour for capital. Perhaps for the economy as a whole and in the long-run the 
assumption of constant output is not valid; indeed the adoption of capital raises the 
productivity of those employed, thus providing a stronger demand for labour in an 
expanding economy. More will be said about structural unemployment in reference to Kt 
in the labour demand equation. For the moment, however, the expected sign on Tt in the 
unemployment equation is negative in both periods. 
The variables Wt and Qt enter the equation as arguments, since it has been 
demonstrated that Ut is partly a disequilibrium phenomenon. The variables in themselves 
are not sufficient to distinguish between (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical 
unemployment, either from a theoretical or from a statistical point of view. 
Multicollinearity will not bias the estimates, but it will lead to an increase in the variances 
of the estimates; Wt and Qt are included for theoretical completeness. The a priori signs 
on Wt and Qt are positive and negative respectively. To allow for the long-run 
endogeneity of Wt the unemployment equation is placed in a system of equations. 
3 . 1 . 2 The Wage Equation: Wt = w(AWt, W ^ , Pt, Ut, Bt) + Et 
The (disequilibrium) wage equation provides the link between the 
unemployment equation and the labour market via the unobserved explanatory variable 
W^f This variable is a measure of labour market tightness, but its sign and significance 
is difficult to predict in relation to the disequilibrium wage (Wt). (Detailed discussion of 
this variable is left to Section 4.2.) The remaining arguments of this equation are 
addressed in the following discussion; what will evolve from the ensuing discussion is 
the expected sign on the other variables (Pt, Ut, Bt, AWt). 
Traditionally, during the upturn of a trade cycle price levels increase (Pt) and 
unemployment levels (Ut) fall. If these variables enter the wage equation as follows; 
Wt = f(Pt,Ut) where ^ > 0 and < 0 
then Wt would exhibit pro-cyclical behaviour with the trade cycle, which is consistent 
with Patinkin's (1956, 1965) disequilibrium analysis of the labour market. A low or 
declining Ut reflects a tight labour market which may explain the pro-cyclical nature of 
Wt. Union activity too, may facilitate this behaviour. 
Conversely, if Pt and Ut enter the wage equation as: 
a w . , a w . ^ < 0 and > ^ 
then Wt will not move pro-cyclically with the trade cycle. This behaviour of Wt is 
consistent with a Walrasian/Classical model of the labour market. As output expands the 
resultant rise in Pt will lower Wt (and hence raise the demand for labour and lower the 
supply of labour). Briefly, during the upturn of a trade cycle Pt may be rising (and Ut 
declining) while real wages (Wt) are declining. The implication for unions is that they: 
i) suffer from money illusion if price increases are imperceptible; or 
ii) accept a real wage reduction in return for job security and high levels of 
employment. That is, money illusion is forced upon unions. In terms of wage 
claims unions therefore may well be passive. 
If Pt and Ut enter with identical signs then the traditional relationship between 
these variables may no longer exist. The two possibilities are: 
or a w n ^ . 
The implication is that a positive relationship between Ut and Pt exists, as opposed to the 
traditional inverse relationship; the traditional relationship between Pt and Ut suggests a 
stable Phillips Curve.^ When Pt and Ut are of identical signs then either: 
i) the Phillips Curve is unstable; or, 
I realize that the original Phillips Curve has on its vertical axis the rate of increase in money 
wages. The aim of this paper is not to analyse the Phillips Curve, but the implication is there. 
ii) a short-run Phillips Curve relationship does not exist unless defined in 
terms of money wages. 
Positive signs suggest a positive (or pro-cyclical) relationship with Wt. When the signs 
on Pt and Ut are negative this suggests an inverse relationship with Wt; for instance, if Pt 
(and Ut) are rising there is a reduction in real wages (Wt). This relationship between Pt 
and Wt implies that union activity with respect to real wages may be a function of Ut, so 
that rising unemployment levels (Ut) are sufficient to dampen union activity. On the 
other hand if Pt (and Ut) are positive then real wages move pro-cyclically and are rising 
or at least being maintained or rising. 
Taking the analysis a little further, for actual real wages to at least equal the 
equilibrium real wage (W®t), there would be no lags in adjustment of money wages to a 
price change. Otherwise real wages will be suppressed below W% even though both 
prices and real wages are rising over time. For example, if the economy is initially in 
equilibrium at position E in diagram 3.2, which designates full employment with real wo 
wages initially denoted by -P^, an increase in aggregate demand increases prices from Pq 
to PI. This lowers the real wage to ^ (Step la). At ^ there is excess demand for 
labour (given by OLi - OL2); this in turn will probably raise money wages from W^ to 
Wl. However, if inflation is validated then Pi will rise to P2, keeping the actual real 
wage below E (step 2). 
If money wages, however, adjust instantaneously to the price rise (Step lb) then 
Wt = W®t. If money wages rise faster than Pt then real wages will rise, possibly above 
point E. If there were no lagged response of money wages then the current value of Pt 
may be expected to be positive and significant. The Arbitration Commission's decisions 
will play a role in determining the value of Pt in relation to Wt. If a change in award 
wages (AWt) is equal to P1-P2 then real wages will be maintained. Indeed, real wages 
may lie above W^t. A positive W t̂ suggests that the market is exerting an influence; in a 
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Note : To illustrate the reverse of Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis where there is 
excessive production and hence over-full employment requires a 
movement to point B. However, to show also the co-existence of a real 
wage underhang is unduly awkward within this framework. This diagram 
is presented as it more clearly illustrates how actual real wages may remain 
below equilibrium values. This analysis is a preparation to understanding 
Keynes' theory of inflation which is presented in Section 4.3. 
dynamic model, a changing W®t will drag Wt with it if the market is exerting an 
influence. 
Moreover, during Period II Australia experienced wage indexation from 1975 to 
1981 and again in 1983. Perry (1983), cited in Veale et. al. (1983), states that although 
the arbitration system may have been a rubber stamp in terms of ratifying collective 
bargaining agreements outside the arbitration system, this ratification of awards flowed 
on quite rapidly to increase other minimum award wages. Indeed, "from 1971 to 1975 
the increase in award wages was much greater than the rate of productivity growth 
(usually between 2 and 3 per cent per year) combined with the rate of growth of prices; 
[these] two variables are the usual grounds for an increase in award wages...In real terms 
award wages grew by an unprecedented 13.85 per cent in 1974. It is difficult to explain 
such increases in terms of demand-pull" (Ibid, p 137-38). Moreover, according to 
Mitchell (1985, p7), "if the return to wage indexation in 1983 has again locked in the 
previous effects of the 1981-82 wage explosion then ...the associated level of 
unemployment could well be locked in by the same mechanisms that were used in the 
1970's". 
In Period I, a priori, the relationship between Wt and Ut should be significant and 
as suspected may be insignificant in Period n. In Period II, as discussed, Wt may well 
be determined by factors other than supply and demand for labour, such as award wage 
(AWt) decisions in line with rises in the price level, Pt. It is thought that union 
aggressiveness in terms of real wage maintenance is another factor in explaining the 
relationship between Wt, AWt, Pt and Ut. The sign on Ut is difficult to predict in period 
II. If institutional factors interupt the link between Wt and Ut, then the relationship 
between these two variables may prove to be insignificant. In Period I, with smaller 
price movements, unions were perhaps less concerned with maintaining the real wage. 
Finally, Pt is assumed to be exogenous because Cronin (1984), citing a number 
of macroeconomic studies, states that prices are not very sensitive to demand conditions. 
Price insensitivity is also consistent with oligopoly theory. On the other hand the 
exogeneity of the level of real unemployment benefits (BO is less certain. Briefly, it may 
be that an increase in the level of Bt raises the reservation wage of the unemployed. The 
expected sign on Bt (assuming that Bt leads to Wt) will be positive. This may have 
occured in PII. The implication is that the rise in the level of Bt will cause a rise in St, 
indirectly Ut = f(Bt); however it is also reasonable to assume that Bt = f(Ut). The rising 
numbers of the unemployed lead, via political activity, to a rise in the level of Bt. It is 
important to note, however, that Bt lies in the wage equation, which will help to 
determine the direction of causation. If the coefficient on Bt is positive (and significant) 
then actual Wt is raised because of a rise in the reservation wage. If the coefficient on Bt 
is negative, which may be expected to occur in PI because Bt changed very littie during 
the 1960s, then Wt will fall. Consequentiy, the sign (and significance) of Bt may 
provide a simple test of causation. 
Summarizing, if one supposes that the Arbitration Commission and unions 
dominated the wage-determination process, (especially in PII), then the coefficient on Pt 
and AWt may be expected to be positive and significant, perhaps over-shadowing the 
impact of W®t. In PI there may have been over-full employment, and current price levels 
(Pt) may not have been a significant explanatory factor in determining Wt. This implies a 
lagged response of money wages to current price changes. In PI the Arbitration 
Commission may have imposed a lagged response, while in PII the institutional setting 
was such as to remove a lagged response of money wages to Pt- Unions too, in PI, may 
have been passive, as previously discussed, so that a lagged adjustment of money wages 
was probably not union induced. 
3 . 1 . 3 The Labour Demand Function: N^ = diW^t, Qt, Kt) + Et 
The demand equation follows Rosen and Quandt (1978), except that capital stock 
(Kt) figures were generated^ and used instead of the simple time proxy. Time captures 
See data source pp.118-19 for construction. 
all factors rather than capital specifically. Rosen's and Quandt's (1978) demand function 
is derived from a profit maximization assumption. Thus, the firm will maximize profit 
given disequilibrium values, along the lines of Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis. Given 
disequilibrium values, the objective of the firm is to maximize profits, although actual 
maximized profit within disequilibrium will be lower than the level of maximized profits 
at traditional static equilibrium. The sign on Kt is again difficult to determine a priori. Its 
inclusion is relevant in a long-run analysis, for in the long-run the firm has the 
opportunity to change factor combinations of Kt and labour (Nt). 
It would be strongly suspected that the coefficient on Kt will be positive, if a 
change in Kt (both in quantity and nature) is labour-augmenting. Given stable 
participation rates the sign on Tt in the unemployment equation may be negative (and 
insignificant) to be consistent with a positive Kt in the employment equation. This 
implies little or no labour displacement when firms adopt capital, and hence little change 
in structural unemployment. If the acquisition of capital displaces labour, and output 
does not rise to compensate the decrease in employment, then Kt will be negative. 
Presumably, the displaced workers no longer have the appropriate skills, and therefore 
may be considered to be structurally unemployed; Tt in the unemployment equation 
would be positive. In short, the signs must be opposite to be consistent. If Kt and Tt 
exhibit the same sign then this would be difficult to explain. 
The coefficient on Kt is expected, however, to be positive. Firstly, Kt and Nt 
will in part be complements as there is little displacement of labour. Some additional 
labour skills will be required to operate new capital. If new capital requires new skills 
(because of the adoption of new technology), then the complementary effect is stronger in 
the long-run when workers have time to acquire the new skills demanded. This line of 
reasoning is echoed by Hamermesh and Rees (1984). Moreover, adopting new capital 
may increase labour productivity, thus potentially raising the demand for labour; or 
prices may be lowered, thus increasing real wages and providing an impetus for 
expanding output which may offset the displacement or substitution effect of capital. 
Layard and Nickell (1985), discredit a number of scenarios suggesting that a 
changing Kt (i.e. adopting new technology) is a significant source of rising 
unemployment. This adds credibility to the a priori reasoning that the coefficient on Kt 
should be positive. They argue, given that if human wants are satiated (or effective 
demand cannot increase), then increased productivity means the displacement of labour 
(i.e. the substitution effect of labour when acquiring Kt is greater than the output effect). 
Layard and Nickell (1985) point out that there is no evidence of satiation. Another 
argument which implies that Kt may be negative, is that the namre of capital is such, that 
when fully utilized, the generated output is insufficient to employ the whole labour 
supply. This, according to Layard and Nickell (1985), was argued by Malinvaud 
(1982). For this to have any explanatory power for Australia, the labour productivity of 
those employed would have to have risen significantly faster in Pn, when unemployment 
started to rise rapidly. This has not occurred, according to Indecs (1986, p73). "Prior to 
the 1974 world-wide recession, the rate of growth of Australian productivity [measured 
as output per person] on this basis had averaged between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent per annum 
depending on the time period measured. Since 1974 there has been a distinctly slower 
trend [in] productivity growth. Over the last decade [1974-85] non-farm productivity 
growth averaged 1.7 per cent per annum." Moreover, according to Layard and Nickell 
(1985, p81) "productivity growth in the United Kingdom fell when unemployment rose". 
This implies that output had fallen. Briefly, I expect on strong a priori reasoning that the 
coefficient on Kt should take on a positive sign. To be consistent, the coefficient on Tt 
is expected to be insignificant and negative. The signs of the other variables are now 
discussed. 
In respect to real wages and output a long controversy exists over the specification 
of the demand for labour function. The demand function here may be viewed as a hybrid 
of Classical and Neo-Keynesian theories. From a Classical perspective only real wages 
would enter the function, while only output would be explicit from a Neo-Keynesian 
perspective. Within a disequilibrium framework both the real wage and output should 
enter the labour demand function. The relative speed of adjustment toward equilibrium 
may distinguish between Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian unemployment. The 
output variable captures changes in product demand; output affects Nt either through 
factor substitution or, assuming competitive conditions, the quantity of production which 
the firm desires to supply. An objection (from a Neo-Classical point of view) is that only 
the price of factors should enter the demand equation (i.e. real wages and the price of 
capital). If the economy is Classical in the sense that economic agents are price-takers 
then the objection would be valid. Firms would choose their output rate to maximize 
profits at a given set of prices; output itself is a function of prices and would not appear 
as an exogenous argument. The theme of this thesis, however, is that the economy does 
not in fact correspond to Classical assumptions. Thus from a dynamic disequilibrium 
perspective, as pointed out in theoretical sections, both real wages and the quantity of 
output are explicit arguments. Moreover, as Hazeldine (1979, pi 1) suggests, it does not 
appear possible to get good fits without including output as a quantity variable in the 
demand function. 
For completeness of the discussion, the assumption behind factor substitution is 
cost minimisation. In dealing with factor substitution the appropriate variable to consider 
is the price of capital relative to the price of labour. The true price of capital, however, is 
difficult to determine and beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, Hazeldine (1979, 
pl3) again points out that "such a variable does not always work econometrically". 
Consequentiy, I proceed by specifying output and Kt as quantities. The expected sign 
on output is positive, and negative for the real wage. 
3 . 1 . 4 The I.ahour Supply Function: N ^ = SiW^t, Lt, Ut) + Et. 
The labour force variable is included as a long-run exogenous argument. 
The a priori sign is positive in both periods, since an increase in the number of persons 
aged 15 years and over increases the potential labour supply. The inclusion of real wages 
is based on tiie theory of leisure-income choice, whilst the inclusion of the Ut variable is 
consistent with disequilibrium theory. 
A positive sign on real wages would be consistent with the traditional pro-cyclical 
nature of the participation rate. The expected sign on Ut needs careful consideration. 
Ham (1986) points out that underlying this type of labour supply curve (i.e. where Ut is 
an argument) are a number of (New)Keynesian disequilibrium models, one of which is 
the Barro and Grossman (1971) model.'̂  If workers are off their supply curves then, as 
Ham (1986) discloses, Ut will be a significant systematic variable. If the sign on Ut, for 
example, is negative then workers will be off their supply curves, and this will indicate 
involuntary unemployment. Briefly, if a significant part of Ut is involuntary then a 
decrease in Ut will constitute an increase in employment (Nt); if vacancies rise, the extra 
vacancies will be filled (i.e. engaged in employment) thus decreasing Ut- This of course 
stands in stark contrast to the Lucas and Rapping (1969) continuous equilibrium model. 
If Ut is significant then this will indicate that workers are off their supply curves, and the 
Lucas and Rapping (1969) model will not be supported. If there is a positive coefficient 
on Ut, this will indicate that workers are on their supply curves, but now unemployment 
may be viewed as voluntary; this may have occurred in PI. 
3 . 2 HFNFRAr COMMENTS 
It should be pointed out that St + Tt in a disequilibrium framework is not 
synonymous with the natural rate of unemployment (NRU); only in equilibrium does St 
+ Tt = NRU. In a disequilibrium framework the variables St + Tt may define NAIRU, 
where NRU may be thought of as a special or unique case of NAIRU. Constant inflation 
is defined as Pt = P*t. but since price expectations (P*t) are not explicit in this model 
there is no guarantee that NAIRU is given by St + Tt in a disequiUbrium phase. 
A further point to note is that Wt and Qt in the unemployment equation are not 
sufficient to distinguish between Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian scenarios. A major 
problem is the probability of multicollinearity between these two variables, but together 
they explain demand-side unemployment. The relative speeds with which Nt and Wt 
adjust toward equilibrium will determine which scenario operates. "In a pure Wakasian 
This model, in particular Patinkin (1956, 1965) has been discussed in section 2.3. 
world adjustment back to market-clearing equilibrium is achieved by means of 
[instantaneous] price adjustment. In a pure [New]Keynesian world there is no price 
adjustment - only quantities adjust as trading occurs at non-market-clearing prices", 
(Levac'ic and Rebmann, 1988, p308). 
Relative speeds of adjustment are to be measured by the partial adjustment 
equation for employment and real wages as developed in section 2.5. The partial 
adjustment of each endogenous variable will take the following form: 
Nt - Nt-i = biCN t̂ - Nt-i) + b2(Wet - Wt-i) (5a) 
Wt - Wt-i = aiCW t̂ - Wt-i) + a2(Net - Nm) (5b) 
The variables W®t and N®t are unobserved notional variables which can be estimated by 
applying Chow's (1983) estimation procedure. These notional variables can now be 
used to estimate, after re-arrangement, equations (5a) and (5b). The algebra is presented 
for (5a), but it is the same for (5b). Solving for Nt gives: 
Nt = biNet+ (l-b2)Nt-i+ bsW^- b4Wt.i. 
As this point estimation may take place, but a theoretical problem exists. Firstly, N®t and 
W®t are simultaneously determined. Therefore N t̂ (and W^t) should be the dependent 
variable. Moreover, b2 only gives the speed of adjustment of one disequilibrium value to 
another, not the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium. While the coefficient bi 
provides only the degree of disequilibrium, rearranging and solving for N^t (and W^O 
will allow for simultaneous estimation and a coefficient which will give the speed of 
adjustment toward equilibrium. Hence, 
N t̂ = (-brl)(l-b2)Nt.i + (-brl)b3Wet - (-brl)b4Wt-i - (-brl)Nt. 
Regressing by using 2SLS (which in this case amounts to indirect least squares), the 
wage and employment equation will give estimates of: 
(-brl)bis , (-brl)(l-b2) and bi-l , where bi = 
The estimates for both equations are: 
N^t = b3Wet+ (l-b2)Nt.i - b4Wt.i + br^ Nt (6a) 
W^t = asN^t + (l-a2)Wt.i + a4Nt.i + ar^ Wt (6b) 
Subsequently, a comparison of b2 and a2 will indicate the relative speeds of adjustment 
toward equilibrium; speed is defined as where AT equals per unit time. If 
for example b2 = 1, adjustment is instantaneous; if b2 = 0 there is complete inertia. The 
coefficients (l-b2 and l-a2) are desirable because, as Bowden (1978) points out, they set 
the limits of adjustment between 0 and 1. Otherwise instantaneous adjustment is given 
by bi = infinity, in other words the value that bi takes on is not bounded. I now turn to 
the estimation of N®t and W®t. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE RESULTS 
4 . 1 t h e R E P U C E P - F O R M EQUATIONS 
Estimates of reduced equations of the form Yt = ZiXt + Z2Yt-i + e are presented 
below for both periods. ̂  Estimating the reduced-form equations, using quarterly data, is 
the first step in generating Y®t. The results of applying OLS to the reduced-form 
equations are presented on the following page. 
The Chow (1983) procedure dictates the specification of the above equations. 
Insignificant variables therefore may not be eliminated from the equations. There is also 
difficulty in assessing the explanatory variables on a priori economic grounds. It may, 
however, be pointed out that the a priori signs on the lagged variables are correct except 
for the variables Nt-i (in equation IIW) and Wt-i (in equation IN). Statistically 11 of the 
24 explanatory variables (excluding the constant) are statistically significant (while Kt and 
Qt in equation EN are easily significant at a lesser level of confidence), and the R^, F 
and the Durban-Watson (D.W) statistics are all satisfactory. Only equation Ir that was 
corrected for auto-correlation, using the Cochrane-Orcutt method, is equation IN. 
According to many econometricians, e.g. Thompson (1985), lagged dependent 
variables render the D.W. test invalid (i.e. D.W. is biased towards 2.) On the other 
hand, according to Koutsoyiannis (1977, p309) this has "alarmed econometricians 
unduly", as the alternative h-test is not without its limitations. The test is inappropriate if 
nv(bi) > 1.2 According to Koutsoyiannis (1981), Malinvaud (1966) found that the bias 
Where Zj = (I-M) 
Z2 = (-BA-̂ M) Xt = 
e = MA-̂ E and 
h = ( l - ^ ^ ) Vn/l-nv(bi) where 
D.W = Duibin Watson statistic n = sample size 
K, U Ut 
VOrV 
and Y, 
Period } [1964(1) - 1972(?) 
R g P U C g D - F Q R M P O U A T I Q N s S 
c K L U Q N.i W,i DW F 
N -14.03 
(1641.16) 
-0.0009 
(0.006) 
0.53 
(0.38)** 
0.60 
(0.29)* 
-0.0014 
(0.003) 
0.025 
(0.18) 
0.64 
(1.68) 
1.56 0.87 34.85 — IN(CO) 
W 400.09 0.0023 -0.076 -0.076 -0.006 -0.018 0.40 
2.05 0.98 276.19 — IW 
(138.67)1 (0.0006)1 (0.03)1 (0.037)" (0.0004)** (0.019) (0.15)1 
Period II [1972(4) - 1986(2) 
C K L U Q Ki W.i DW F 
N -187.80 -0.004 0.22 0.015 0.006 0.90 -2.66 
1.90 0.92 98.41 - UN 
(679.94) (0.003) (0.164)** (0.195) (0.005) (0.14)1 (1.11)" 
W -9.30 
(59.60)1 
0.00003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.014) 
0.0018 
(0.017) 
-0.00013 
(0.0004) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.77 
(0.098)1 
1.60 0.93 114.77 - n w 
1 
a = * = 
* * _ 
CO = 
1% level of significance 
2.5% level of significance 
5% level of significance 
10% level of significance 
corrected for auto-correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique 
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis 
in the D.W statistic will decline if other variables apart from the lagged dependent 
variables are used as explanatory variables. Taylor and Wilson (1964), using an 
amended form of the D.W test (i.e. rejecting the null hypothesis if D.W < dL and 
accepting if D.W > du), tested for the presence of serial correlation in O.L.S. regression 
with lagged dependent variables. They found that the D.W test performs well: 
i) the larger the size of the sample, 
ii) the larger the R^, and 
iii) the larger the absolute value of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable. 
The sample size for Period I is 35 and 55 for Period II. The lowest 'R^ is 0.87 
and generally, (except for equation IN) the value of the lagged dependent coefficient 
relative to other variables in the respective equations appear not to be too small. There 
appears to be little to choose between the D.W and h-tests. Consequently, on the basis 
of the D.W statistic, it is concluded that there is no significant serial correlation. 
According to Leobo (1976, p499) "a rule of thumb...[in practice]...is, if the D.W statistic 
is between 1.5 and 2.5 serial correlation is not significant." The D.W statistics of all 
equations are within this range; the D.W for equations IW and UN are 2.05 and 1.90 
respectively, which are not significantly different from 2. It is perhaps surprising that 
only one equation warranted correction for serial correlation. Thompson (1985) explains 
that, if the presence of serial correlation initially exists in the data, then the introduction of 
a lagged dependent variable will remove it. 
Briefly, the four equations are quite acceptable. Experimenting with log-linear 
form and various lags did not, in an overall sense, improve the equations presented. In 
Period I, lagging Nt and Wt (both linear and log-linear) more than one period (up to 4 
periods i.e. one year) resulted in a decline in the number of significant variables. 
Lagging Wt in equation IN more than one period rarely yielded a correct sign. When it 
did, however, other lagged variables exhibited incorrect signs. The scenario is similar 
for Period H. Lagging Nt more than one period (both linear and log linear) rarely yielded 
a correct sign. As in Period I when the sign was correct, there was a loss in the number 
of significant variables and other lagged variables yielded incorrect signs. Consequently, 
the reduced-form equations presented here are used to generate Y®t via the equation: 
Y^t = -BA-lXt where 
-BA-1 = -BA-lM(M-l) 
and M-l is derived from (I-M)^. 
It may be noted that estimates of -BA-l using the Chow (1983) procedure are 
consistent. Ordinarily, however, estimates of equations (such as the reduced equations) 
that follow a geometric lag of the general form, 
Yt = a i Xt + a2 Yt-i + et 
yield both biased and inconsistent estimates of a i and a2. Thompson (1985) however, 
points out that the presence of serial correlation alone does not lead to bias or inconsistent 
estimates; a dependent variable alone leads to bias only but not inconsistency. It is the 
combination of serial correlation and Yt-i that results in the OLS estimator being both 
biased and inconsistent. Implicit in the error term (et) is a geometric lag structure where 
the disturbance term is auto-correlated. The estimates a i and a2 will be biased and 
inconsistent because there will be simultaneous correlation between et and Yt-i. 
The partial adjustment equation (after appropriate substitution) also follows the 
structure of a geometric lag, yet the estimates yielded remain consistent. This is due to 
the nature of the partial adjustment equation. In essence the disturbance term is not auto-
correlated"^. Hence, the application of OLS to the reduced-form equations will generate 
consistent estimates, but will remain biased because of the inclusion of Yt-i. Bias of 
estimates, however, may be less severe as the reduced equations form the basis of 
calculating the unobservable equilibrium values of the real wage and employment, from 
which both the model and adjustment equations can be estimated. The paper now turns 
to the adjustment equations. 
3 Refer to section 2.5 
^ See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion. 
4 . 2 THE ADTIJSTMENT EOIJATTONS 
Generating observations of Y®t makes possible the estimation of the adjustment 
equations. Hopefully the equations will determine whether the economy is characterized 
by Neo-Classical or (New)Keynesian unemployment. Moreover, the adjustment 
equation with respect to employment may also shed light on labour hoarding. 
Consequently, adjustment equations of the form: 
Net= (-brl)(l-b2)Nt.i + (-brl)b3Wet-(-brl)b4Wt-i-(-brl)Nt 
W t̂ = (-ari)(l-a2)Wt.i + (-arl)a3Net - (-arl)a4Nt.i - (-arl)Wt 
were estimated for both periods using 2SLS. Joint estimation is theoretically more 
desirable than single equation estimation. Since the model is just identified, 2SLS is 
equivalent to indirect least squares. Koutsoyiannis (1977, p251) suggests that the 
problem of multicollinearity may be bypassed if a simultaneous estimation procedure is 
applied. Calculation of aî  and bî  is derived as follows: 
bi = -brHbO/bi-l and ai= -arHaO/arl where i = l , 3 , 4 . 
Thompson (1985), notes that the property of consistency carries over to the resultant bî  
and aî - The estimator will have large-sample properties only; a large sample is 
considered to be 32 observations and greater. It is important to note that the size of a2 
and b2 will show explicitiy the speed of adjustment of Wt and Nt respectively toward 
equilibrium. Speed is defined as: 
N t̂ - Nt-i/Tt - Tt-i, where T = time. 
Since Tt - Tm is equal to unity, the coefficients of b2 and a2 will yield directly the speed 
of adjustment toward equilibrium. The estimates of the adjustment equations for both 
periods are presented below. 
ADTIISTMENT EQUATIONS 
ADJUSTMENT EOIJATTONS 
Per iod I 
bsW-t MWM l-b2Nt.i bf^N, c DW SER 
(-bi-̂ )V 2.57 1.24 0.096 0.572 760.19 1.75 18.22 aa) 
Standard 
errors 
V 
(1.02) 
4.49 
(1.00) 
2.17 
(0.12) 
b2=.83 
(0.10) (293.3) 
(CO) 
a priori sign + + -1- + 
(1%) (15%) (1%) (1%) 
asN«, l-a2Wt.i a4Nt-i af^W, C DW SER 
(-ai-^)ai^ 0.022 -0.172 0.028 0.544 -99.05 1.84 2.74 (lb) 
Standard 
errors 
aî  
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
a2=1.32 
(0.017) 
0.05 
(0.16) (26.55) (CO) 
a priori sign + + -1- + 
(15%) (15%) 
(almost) 
(5%) (1%) (1%) 
Per iod I I 
N̂  b3W^ M^l-l l-b2Nt-i bf^N, C DW SER 
(-bf^)V 8.61 -0.46 -0.23 0.265 2617.13 1.98 54.48 (Ha) 
Standard 
errors 
V 
(2.11) 
32.49 
(1.29) 
-1.74 
(0.18) 
b2=1.87 
(0.18) (279.16) 
(CO) 
a priori sign + + -h + 
(1%) 
(almost) 
(10%) 
(almost) 
(5%) (1%) 
w^ asN t̂ l-a2Wt.i a4Ni-i ar^w, C DW SER 
(-ai-l)ai'̂  0.07 0.128 0.003 0.123 -177.23 1.48 3.34 (Hb) 
Standard 
errors 
ai'' 
(0.014) 
0.57 
(0.13) 
a2=-.04 
(0.006) 
0.024 
(0.12) (40.68) 
a priori sign + + + + 
(1%) (10%) (10%) (1%) 
C = constant. 
DW = Durban Watson statistic. 
CO = Cochran-Orcutt corrective technique for serial correlation. 
SER = Standard error of regression. Significance levels are presented in parenthesis. 
Using the Cochrane-Orcutt prcx^edure, all equations except lib were corrected for 
serial correlation. Correcting lib for auto-correlation reduced the value of the D.W 
statistic; it was decided, therefore, not to correct this equation (lib) for auto-correlation. 
The D.W of 1.48 just lies outside the range ±1.5 (Leabo, 1976) and the a priori signs are 
most satisfactory. The a priori signs are based on the reasoning that both employment 
and wages move pro-cyclically over the trade cycle. Based on this a priori reasoning the 
equations, in general, are satisfactory. Only Wt-i in equation Ha and lib exhibited a more 
orthodox relationship. Perhaps equation Ila did not warrant correction for auto-
correlation since, prior to correction, the value of the D.W statistic was 1.63; however, 
only the constant was statistically significant. In terms of statistical confidence, 9 out of 
the 20 variables are significant at the 1% level of significance, and 2 variables are 
significant at the 5% level. Finally, the SER appear to be satisfactorily low. On a priori 
and statistical grounds the equations are satisfactory. I now turn to the interpretation of 
the adjustment coefficients a2 and b2 of Chow's (1983) adjustment equations. 
Chow's (1983) partial adjustment equation is easier to interpret if equation (10) 
from section 2.4 is recast as, 
Yt = MYet + (I-M) Yt-i. 
If M equals I then the equation collapses to Yt = IY®t, which suggests that equilibrium 
variables are observable, which in turn implies continuous equilibrium, and therefore 
instantaneous adjustment. If M equals zero there is no adjustment (i.e. complete inertia), 
since Yt = lYt-i. The current disequilibrium variables are equal to the previous period's 
disequilibrium variables. In terms of the employment adjustment equations (la and lia), 
the range from zero to unity will measure the degree of labour hoarding. If b2 = 1 there 
is no lagged response by firms, and adjustment of their stock of labour (the actual 
number of those employed) is instantaneous and therefore costiess. If b2 = 0 then the 
labour stock is not adjusted by firms to changes in the level of economic activity: there is 
complete inertia. Note, however, that firms may still adjust the flow of labour services 
(i.e. they will employ overtime during upturns and under-utilize their stock of labour 
during economic downturns). Finally, this paper did not constrain the coefficients a2 
and b2 to lie between zero and unity. It was decided to estimate unconstrained values of 
a2 and b2. 
The coefficient a2 (= 1.32) suggests that in Period I wages did adjust toward 
equilibrium within one time period; the speed of adjustment is instantaneous. The 
coefficient b2 (= .83) in Period I suggests a speed of adjustment which is less than 
instantaneous. In Period n the reverse occurred, that is, wages (based on the value of a2 
= -0.04) did not adjust at all towards equilibrium, while labour adjusted instantaneously 
towards equilibrium (b2 = 1.87). The value of b2 in Period n appears to be too high 
since it suggests that the adjustment of labour by firms is cosdess. A summary table is 
presented below: 
Table 4.1 
Adjustment Coefficients 
Wage Employment 
adjustment adjustment 
(a2) (b2) 
Periodi 1.32 .83(.54) NC b2 < a2 
Period n -0.04 1.87 NK b2 > a2 
On the surface it appears that a Neo-Classical (NC) scenario was operative in Period I, 
since wages adjust faster toward equilibrium than employment (b2 < a2), and a 
(New)Keynesian (NK) scenario is operative in Period H, because employment adjusts 
faster toward equilibrium than wages (b2 > a2). If this assessment is correct, then real 
wages will enter the structural equations of the model as a significant explanation of 
employment and unemployment in Period I, while in Period II output may enter the 
model as the most important variable. Analysis of the model is left to the next section. 
The size of a2 in Period II appears to suggest that the labour market has little to do 
with determining the actual level of wages, since Wt does not adjust toward W®t. It is 
expected, therefore, that the mcxiel that follows will indicate other factors, rather than the 
equilibrium wage, that will determine the actual real wage. In Period I, where a2 =1.32, 
the implication is that the labour market (and hence W^O plays a significant role in 
explaining actual real wages. One may expect W®t to be significant in the wage equation 
for Period I. As a consequence, the structural equations of the model should also supply 
evidence of voluntary unemployment. Moreover, since a2 in Period I implies 
instantaneous adjustment, then the actual wage should equal, approximately, the 
equilibrium wage. Indeed, a value for W®t of $202.86 is approximately equal to the 
average value for Wt of $194.95. 
Comparison of b2 across both periods offers some interesting interpretations 
conceming firms' behaviour in respect to the adjustment of their labour stock. Clearly, in 
Period II labour stock has become more sensitive to changes in economic activity 
(output). There is evidence of labour dis-hoarding, which further indicates that 
businesses in Period 11 have become less optimistic conceming recovery after an 
economic downturn. The change in the behaviour of firms across the two periods, with 
respect to labour dis-hoarding in Period 11, is consistent with Mangan (1981). 
Consequentiy, it is expected that variations in output will explain less of the variation in 
employment and unemployment in Period I than in Period H. A value of .83 for b2 in 
Period I, which is less than unity, implies some degree of labour hoarding, but is too 
high to conclude significant levels of labour hoarding. An alternative value of 0.54 for b2 
in Period I does suggest significant degrees of labour hoarding. This alternative value 
was calculated from equation la before it was corrected for autocorrelation. 
Measuring employment (NO as man-hours instead of the number employed, 
(from which relative speeds of labour hours employed and real wages may be 
determined), may have yielded different results, but data constraints meant that stock 
measures were used to capture the demand for labour. It is not altogether unfortunate, 
however, as it has highlighted a change in business behaviour. Essentially, businesses in 
Period n, have adjusted their stock of labour more readily to variations in output than in 
Period I. 
Finally, brief mention should be made of the model's stability. A definition of 
dynamic stability is provided by Kmenta (1971, p592-3), where "in general...a system is 
stable if, in a situation where the values of the exogoneous variables are held constant 
through time, the mean values of the endogenous variables(s) settie down to some 
constant level...The system is considered unstable if, for constant values of the 
exogenous variables, the mean values of the endogenous variables either explode or 
display a regular oscillatory movement". Diagram 4.1 illustrates both a stable and an 
unstable model. 
Part (a) illustrates a stable cobweb model. The dampened oscillatory pattern of 
the endogenous variables over time for a stable cobweb are depicted in parts (ai) and (aii). 
An unstable model, where the endogenous variables oscillate in a constant or explosive 
manner, is depicted in parts (b) and (c) respectively. Part (d) illustrates a stable model 
where exogenous variables are not constant. That is, either supply and demand curves in 
the cobweb model shift over time, thus changing the equilibrium position through time 
from ei to e2 to es. Notice tiiat equilibrium positions may change before actual values 
equal equilibrium values, so that I assume disequilibrium to be the rule, rather than the 
exception. A positive sign on W®t in the wage equations is consistent with a stable model 
where equilibrium positions change, since Wt will follow W®t. 
Following Rao (1983), eigenvalues are computed as a test for stability. 
According to Chow (1983, pl47) when eigenvalues are less than unity in absolute values 
a model is said to be stable.^ The eigenvalues calculated from the adjustment equations 
for Period I are 0.267 and 0.191, and for Period H 0.427 and 0.067, which are all less 
than one. 
5 In reference to a single-equation see Kmenta (1971, p593). In reference to multi-equations 
(matrices) see Gandolfo (1971,1980,1981) and Griliches and Intrilligator (1983). 
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4 . 3 THE STRUCTURAL EOIJATTONS: A DTSCUSSTON 
The regression results for both periods are presented below. The 2SLS procedure 
was used to minimize simultaneous bias and, except for equation (IW), the correction for 
serial correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique was warranted. Again the S.E.R. 
are satisfactorily low. 
Period IT 
It was demonstrated in the previous section that in Period 11 businesses more 
readily adjusted their labour stock to variations in output (Qt). Therefore, output (Qt) is 
expected to be significant relative to real wages. Also the a priori expectation (based on 
the previous section) is that the labour market (i.e. W®t) does not determine actual real 
wages (Wt). 
Inspection of Qt in equations IIU and IID supports our a priori expectations. 
Clearly Qt is not only highly significant but also exhibits the correct a priori signs. W®t is 
also insignificant. Real wages (Wt) do not exhibit the signs dictated by traditional 
economics. Indeed, they are the opposite of what orthodox economics predicts. They 
are consistent, however, with the pro-cyclical nature of real wages. This in turn is also 
consistent with the Patinkin (1956, 1965) analysis, where a positive relationship 
between employment and real wages is possible: if the economy is depressed, then upon 
stimulation the real wage will move directly with economic activity, with a rise in both 
output and employment (see Section 2.3). 
Due to dis-hoarding in Period II, and since real wages are positively correlated 
with Qt, Nt will vary more closely with Qt- Moreover, the pro-cyclical nature of real 
wages is further reinforced by the signs on Pt (positive) and Ut (negative) in equation 
n w (refer to section 3.1.2).6 Consequendy, a positive coefficient on the real wage in the 
labour demand function, and a negative coefficient on the real wage in the unemployment 
equation, are consistent with the theory presented. The statistical insignificance of the 
Section 3.1 is relevant for assessing the model. 
real wage in the unemployment function (IIU) maybe accounted for by a greater variation 
in Ut, due to volatilily in factors such as the participation rate and output. 
Both the variables Pt and AWt are statistically significant (AWt also exhibits the a 
priori sign), strongly suggesting that an arbitration/union nexus, at the expense of labour 
market forces as implied by W®t being insignificant, predominantly explains the level of 
actual real wages (Wt) as discussed in section 3.1.2. An insignificant coefficient on Ut in 
nW implies that union activity in terms of Wt may be active and independent of Ut. This 
is further borne out by the fact that W®t is insignificant, which is consistent with the 
coefficient a2 (= -0.04) for Period II as discussed in the previous section. Moreover, the 
positive sign on W®t is consistent with the eigenvalues of 0.427 and 0.067, but the fact 
that W®t is insignificant and thus explains little variation in Wt, implies that the behaviour 
of the model, although stable, is perhaps approaching constant oscillations as depicted by 
diagram 4.1(b). That is, the less the market responds to the difference in supply and 
demand, the less equilibrium values (W^t) have to do with explaining variations in actual 
values (Wt). 
At this stage is is worth noting that, on the surface, Nt is a major source of 
adjustment. This indicates a (New)Keynesian scenario, which also was implied in the 
previous section. This is further reinforced by the negative sign on the statistically 
significant variable, Ut, in the labour supply equations. Ham (1986) argues that this 
indicates involuntary unemployment (refer to Section 3.1.4). 
Further investigation of the model, however, indicates the presence of Neo-
classical unemployment. The positive sign on variable Bt in the wage equation suggests 
that a reservation wage mechanism may be present (refer to section 3.1.2). This, 
coupled with the negative coefficient on St in equation (IIU), suggests a rise in voluntary 
or search unemployment. Its magnitude, however, suggests that Neo-Classical 
unemployment is of little importance. The construction of the variable (St = Bt/Wt), 
however, may be inadequate as Bt only captures unemployment benefits for single adult 
males (without dependants). Bt does not capture all the monetary and non-monetary 
R E S U I ^ T S 
Period II 
(nu) C Wt St Tt DW SER 
Unemployment 
equation 
(Ut) 
1722.65 
(566.51) 
-1.58 -0.013 
(1.71) (0.002) 
-980.06 
(674.08) 
-10.76 
(10.76) 
1.80 49.11 
1% 1% 10% 
Almost 
15% (CO) 
(nw) C AWi W« Pt Ut Bt DW SER 
Real Wage 
equation 
(WO 
105.52 0.71 0.02 
(63.86) (0.13) (0.28) 
0.35 
(0.16) 
-0.0008 
(0.02) 
0.28 
(0.19) 
1.94 3.28 
Almost 
5% 1% 2.5% 10% (CO) 
(UU) C W® Q Kt DW SER 
Labour 
demand 
equation 
(N^t) 
105.09 
(167.89) 
19.57 
(1.20) 
0.013 
(0.0013) 
-0.004 
(.0003) 
1.64 8.05 
1% 1% 1% 1% (CO) 
(US) C Lt Ut DW SER 
Labour 
supply 
equation 
(N^) 
928.83 
(122.70) 
28.92 
(0.20) 
-0.26 
(0.012) 
-0.24 
(0.01) 
2.00 3.03 
1% 1% 1% 1% (CO) 
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
SER = Standard Error of Regression. 
D.W. = Durbin-Watson Statistic. 
CO = Cochrane-Orcutt Producedure. 
C = Constant. 
Level of statistical significance are indicated below the respective variables. 
R E S U L T S 
Period I 
(lU) C Wt St Tt DW SER 
Unemployment 
equation -157.97 
TO (48.12) 
1.30 -0.003 439.81 
(0.3) (0.002) (164.75) 
-6.67 
(5.32) 
1.73 14.48 
1% 1% 5% 1% 
Almost 
10% (CO) 
OW) c AWt W t̂ Pt Ut Bt DW SER 
Real Wage 
equation 
(WO 
-27.36 
(11.88) 
0.23 
(0.06) 
0.63 
(0.15) 
-0.54 
(0.98) 
0.017 
(0.06) 
-0.23 
(0.14) 
1.89 2.35 
2.5% 1% 1% 10% 
(ID) C Kt DW SER 
Labour 
demand 
equation 
(N^t) 
2504.27 
(2.33) 
-3.40 -
(0.05) 
0.005 
(.00007) 
0.014 
(.00004) 
1.93 0.68 
1% 1% 1% 1% (CO) 
as ) C Lt Ut DW SER 
Labour 
supply 
equation 
(N^t) 
230.50 
(21.55) 
0.52 
(0.12) 
0.49 
(0.005) 
0.66 
(0.03) 
2.01 2.10 
1% 1% 1% 1% (CO) 
benefits of being unemployed such as medical, transport and housing concessions which 
are especially important for families, nor the pleasure derived from not working, or a 
reduction in the work ethic. Essentially, Neo-Classical aspects are present in the model, 
since social and economic institutions (as indicated by the prominence of AWt and Pt at 
the expense of W®t) appear to have generated a real wage overhang. The estimate of W®t, 
(equal to $230.43 on average), is below Wt ($262.78), which is a real wage overhang. 
The model is performing well, as it has generated a real wage overhang which is 
characteristic of Period II (Indecs, 1986). In the model, however, the real wage 
overhang can be explained equally well by a decline in Qt or an arbitration/union nexus. 
For example, as briefly explained in Section 3.1.2, award wage decisions, probably 
resulting from union pressure, may maintain real wages above the market clearing level. 
This scenario, as pictured here, is consistent with Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis and is 
described by Barro and Grossman (1971) as Neo-Classical Involuntary unemployment. 
Stimulating output will not reduce unemployment unless the real wage is reduced, but a 
reduction in real wages may not in itself be sufficient to expand output and hence 
employment (i.e. decrease unemployment). This is consistent with the analysis in 
Section 2.3, which supports the proposition that, as Wt approaches W^t, unemployment 
may remain unchanged or only decline slighdy, i.e. non-clearing market equilibrium. 
According to Trivedi and Baker (1982), evidence suggests the emergence of Neo-
Classical unemployment. However, they found, by further manipulation of their model, 
that after 1972, firms were constrained by orders for their goods. It appears, therefore, 
that firms are quantity-constrained, which implies demand-deficiency. Clearly this can be 
described as Neo-Classical involuntary unemployment. It appears, therefore, that both 
real wages and quantity constraints, both of which are demand factors, explain variations 
in Ut for Period II. 
This last proposition is supported by the fact that both the non-demand factors (St 
and Tt in equation IIU) are insignificant. The sign on the Stoikov Index (Tt) supports the 
hypothesis that structural unemployment explains littie variation of a rising Ut in Period 
II. Trivedi and Baker (1985) also found that the Stoikov index was not important in 
explaining Ut. Supporting this is Mitchell's (1983) survey of the Australian labour 
market, which found no evidence that change in the composition of the labour force or 
social changes are the root of the level of increased unemployment since the early 1970s 
(King, 1986, pl02). King (1986, pl02) however, states that while Mitchell did not 
provide a detailed refutation, "Mitchell was correct with respect to the current 
unemployment, which is overwhelmingly demand-deficient in nature, and [...] past 
experience suggests little reason to fear a substantial rise in structural unemployment in 
any future vigorous upswing". 
An unexpected result, however, is the variable Kt in equation ED. It is significant 
and yielded a negative sign. While it was expected to be significant, the sign runs 
counter to the above conclusions and the body of theory presented in section 3.1.3. If 
output (Qt) is pressing against productive capacity, it is reasonable to assume that firms 
may expand their capital stock (Kt). The implication of a negative sign on Kt in the 
employment function is: 
(i) that the displacement of labour would contribute to structural unemployment, 
therefore Tt in the unemployment equation should be significant and positive; and 
(ii) labour productivity should increase because the capital-labour ratio would be 
rising. Increasing capital stock relative to the quantity of labour employed, 
assuming that output either increases or remains constant, should increase output 
per worker. 
The variable used to capture structural unemployment (Tt) in Period 11, however, is 
statistically insignificant and yields a negative sign. The two variables enter the model 
with the same sign and are therefore inconsistent. Moreover, as indicated by Indecs 
(1986), Australia has wimessed declining growth rates of average productivity of labour 
during Period H. These conflicts need explanation, which is attempted below. 
One explanation is that the conflicting signs on Kt and Tt may have arisen because 
the structural unemployment variable (Tt) is inadequate in capuiring shifts in labour skills 
demanded and supplied. Perhaps other measures of structural unemployment should be 
tried. Alternatively, evidence of a real wage overhang in Period n is consistent with a 
negative Kt, in equation IID. That is, firms which are output-constrained, but face 
excessive real wages may, in the long run, be induced to increase their capital stock in an 
attempt to reduce production costs. A rising capital-labour ratio, if associated with 
sluggish growth in Qt, may reflect declining growth in labour productivity. 
Furthermore, if we accept that the variable Kt is capturing labour substitution, the 
conflict between the signs on Kt and Tt may be resolved when one acknowledges that, 
because output is deficient in Period U, it has not offset the rise in unemployment due to 
labour displacement. If the displaced labour remains unemployed because of poor 
growth in output, we may still conclude that unemployment is the result of insufficient 
output. The substitution effect of labour for capital is greater than the output effect. 
It is difficult, however, faced with a negative coefficient on Kt to accept that the 
displaced labour does not show up as being structurally unemployed, although, if they 
reject jobs that do not require their skills, then the displaced workers may be viewed as 
becoming involuntary unemployed. The model indicates that Qt is significant in 
explaining both employment and unemployment in a period that experienced rising 
unemployment (graph 1.1, section 1.1.1). Adopting Kt which displaces labour when 
output (Qt) is constrained, is consistent with labour dis-hoarding. In contrast, if output is 
expanding when firms are adopting labour-saving capital, then labour productivity should 
I I 
rise without contributing to unemployment. Levacic and Rebmann (1988, p70), make 
the point that "the acquisition of labour-saving capital equipment will reduce firms' 
demand for specific types of labour and for labour in general unless demand growth 
keeps pace with the increase in labour productivity." 
Assuming, however, that output is not constrained, the real wage overhang (and 
labour dis-hoarding) still flies in the face of declining growth rates of average 
productivity of labour during Period n (Index, 1986); too high a real wage will lead to 
increased Kt and retrenchment of the least efficient labour, which raises productivity. 
However: 
i) productivity is difficult to measure; in particular, averages may hide rapid 
productivity growth in many industries (of different sizes). An unweighted 
average smooths out differences across industries; 
ii) there may be disguised productivity increases. The nature of some changing 
capital is not as readily measurable as physical output, and 
iii) in practice firms retrench labour based on other principles, such as marital status 
or the "last-on-ñrst-off' principle. 
At this stage we are unable fully to explain these results. The assumption of 
unconstrained output, however, does not appear to be plausible for Period n. Rather, 
evidence of firms facing output constraints, in Period H, has been presented earlier in this 
section and section 2.3.1. 
Finally, W®t in nS confirms the established behaviour of the participation rate. It 
would appear that the behaviour of the participation rate in the mid 1970s, as described 
by Gregory and Duncan ((1979 (in Gregory, 1984)) was atypical. The negative sign on 
Lt in Period II is unusual and up to now remains unexplained. In Period I, however, Lt 
in equation IS indicates appropriately the positive relationship between Lt and N®t. 
Moreover, W®t in IS exhibits the same leisure-income trade-offs as in Period II. We now 
turn to Period I in more detail. 
?^rÍQ(í I 
As in Period n there is no evidence of structural unemployment. Variables Kt and 
Tt enter the model with opposite signs suggesting little labour substitution. The 
coefficient on Kt is positive which is consistent with the proposition that capital is labour-
augmenting. The coefficient on the variable Tt is insignificant and negative, which 
indicates that structural unemployment does not explain Ut in Period I. The variable St is 
highly significant and the positive sign indicates a high degree of voluntary 
unemployment (Section 3.1.1). This is reinforced by the significant positive sign on Ut 
in equation IS, which again indicates voluntary unemployment (Ham 1986). If 
unemployment in Period I is primarily voluntary, one would expect actual wages (Wt) to 
be either below or equal to equilibrium wages (W®t)- Indeed, on average, actual wages 
(= $194.95) were estimated by the model to be just below equilibrium wages ($202.86). 
In essence, if unemployment in Period I is voluntary then wages should be the primary 
source of adjustment in the labour market. This is borne out by the correct signs on the 
statistically significant wage variables in the relevant structural equations and the analysis 
in the previous section, where the value of a2 in Period I suggests instantaneous 
adjustment. 
A theoretical scenario which explains the real wage underhang (i.e. actual wages 
suppressed below equilibrium wages) is Keynes' theory of inflation (cited in Trevithick 
and Mulvey (1976)). The theory is also satisfying in two other respects as it allows for: 
i) inflation that is contained; and 
ii) a rising real wage over time, even though it is suppressed below equilibrium. 
These two characteristics are also consistent with the experience of the 1960s in Period I. 
The Neo-Keynesian one-sector output model, which underlies the IS-curve in the 
IS-LM framework, implies convergence of inflation. Keynes, however, in his article 
'How to Pay for the War* (cited by Trevithick and Mulvey (1976)), raises the possibility 
that inflation may be persistent. The distribution of income between workers and 
business (owners of capital) plays a crucial role. Keynes assumed a wage-price 
mechanism (which is akin to a wage-price spiral) where prices react instantaneously to 
wages, while money wages respond fully, with a lag to price rises by a constant factor 
(say X). This is summarised in the following two equations: 
Pt = (1 + X) Wt (i) 
Wt = Pt-i 
Prices and wages will continue to rise at the proportional rate of X in all periods except 
the first. Inflation will occur at a constant rate. If either labour or businesses try to gain 
greater amounts than X, then inflation will accelerate, which appears to have occurred in 
Period II as evidenced by a significant positive Pt in equation IIW. In Period I, the 
variable Pt is insignificant, and thus does not explain variations in Wt. The difference in 
the significance of Pt across periods suggests a lagged response to money wages that 
have at least instantly adjusted or even over-adjusted to a rise in current prices. 
Consequently, the variable Pt in Period I is consistent with Keynes' theory of inflation. 
In Period II there appears to be no lag between money wages and Pt; the evidence of a 
real wage overhang for this period is consistent with greater claims on X . To test the 
credibility of the lagged scenario it was decided to lag prices in the wage equation for 
Period I. The results are presented below;'̂  
IW(a) C AWt W t̂ Pt-6 Ut DW SER 
Wt -57.65 0.21 0.12 3.85 0.001 1.93 1.66 
(23.40) (0.04) (0.14) (1.44) (0.02) 
2.5% 1% 1% (CO) 
Clearly Pt becomes highly significant when lagged six periods. This adds 
credibility to the lagged scenario presented by Keynes (as set out by Trevithick and 
Mulvey (1976)). Equation IIW indicates that a lag does not operate in Period 11. To 
confirm this, prices were lagged up to six periods; predictably the coefficient was not 
significant. 
Note that Bt in IWa was omitted because the negative sign on Bt in (IW) indicates 
that causation between Wt and Bt does not flow in the direction that is implied by 
specifying Bt on the right hand side of the equation (see section 3.1.2). The 
unemployment variable is insignificant in both equations (IW, IW(a)), as was the case in 
IIW. The variable was equally insignificant in both equations, but W^t became 
insignificant in IW(a). This is not too disappointing, as it was argued that arbitration in 
Period I may have imposed a lag in labour market adjustment. 
The equation warranted correction for auto-correlation, using the Cochrane-Orcutt (CO) 
technique. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and the respective levels of statistical 
significance are presented below each respective variable. The standard error of regression is 
satisfactorily low. 
In summary, equation IW(a) supports the suggestion of a lagged response of 
money wages to current prices. Perhaps in Period I, unlike Period H, unions were pre-
occupied with working conditions and prices were considered less significant. Perhaps 
workers suffered from money illusion, but according to Neo-Keynesians this assumption 
would cause inflation to decline. Inflation was persistent and fairly constant, which is 
what Keynes' scenario predicts. The scenario explains the real wage underhang which 
also allows for real wages to rise over time. 
How would one describe or characterize the economy during Period I? The 
adjustment equation suggests that the economy conforms to Neo-Classical theory, since 
real wages are the major source of adjustment. Indeed, real wages are more significant in 
the unemployment equation (lU) in explaining unemployment than is output. The 
relationship, unlike that in Period II, exhibits the traditional (Neo-Classical) relationship 
between Ut and Wt. The inverse relationship between employment and real wages is 
confirmed by the coefficient on W®t in equation ID. The economy during Period I 
conforms to Neo-Classical theory, in that real wages changes were sufficient to stimulate 
sufficient output to provide full employment. 
A disequilibrium regime, not expected to occur until this point, but which is found 
in the literature of disequilibrium, is 'Repressed Inflation'. This regime is characterised 
not only by a real wage underhang (excess demand for labour in the labour market), but 
also by excess demand in the product market: both goods and labour market are 
characteerised by excess demand. Clearly, this describes Period I. There is evidence of 
a real wage underhang; sufficient or high output levels (excess product demand), and 
hence at least full employment and finally, constant but contained inflation rates (i.e. 
repressed due to a real wage underhang). Product market equations would need to be 
added to the existing model to determine this. This thesis, however, tentatively 
concludes that Period I can be best described as a 'Repressed Inflation' regime. 
Excess demand in the product market certainly explains why output is highly 
significant (although less significant than real wages) in equation lU. 
A (New)Keynesian, however, would question why there is excess demand for output 
when real wages are low, since real wages constitute a significant proportion of aggregate 
(effective) product demand. In Period I the high levels of output may be explained by 
reference to fiscal policy. 
Probably, fiscal policy was more effective in Period I than in Period H, because 
of the following factors: 
i) A real wage underhang. In Period II it was demonstrated that a real wage 
overhang thwarted economic expansion, and labour costs rose. 
ii) Smaller leakages in Period I. Perhaps in Period II the marginal propensities to 
import, save and tax have risen. For example, bracket creep (due to inflation) has 
pushed incomes into higher marginal tax brackets. Consequently, the income 
multiplier with respect to net government spending on goods and services is 
smaller. 
iii) Related to (ii), given that fiscal policy is less expansionary in Period II, then 
shortfalls in government revenues have had to be made up by government 
borrowing (i.e. selling bonds to the public), thus placing pressure on the financial 
market to raise interest rates. The higher interest rates have dampening effects on 
the economy which further lower the income multipliers. Borrowing from the 
Reserve Bank may validate the inflationary process by increasing the growth rate 
of the money supply. 
iv) Unlike Period I, budgets in Period II had a greater proportion of spending on 
transfer payments relative to government spending on goods and services. A 
possible indirect effect is to reduce the economy's capacity to generate taxation 
revenue because the budget is less effective in stimulating national income. This 
in turn has implications for public sector borrowing requirements to the extent that 
an expanding budget deficit does not generate increases in taxation revenue. If 
growth in national income is slow, number (iii) above, will be exacerbated. 
To the extent that excess aggregate product demand in Period I is the result of 
effective fiscal management, and Keynes' theory of inflation is consistent with the 
disequilibrium regime of 'repressed inflation', then clearly this regime also has elements 
of Keynesianism. The 'repressed inflation' regime, as in Period I, is a mix of 
(New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical scenarios. It is Neo-Classical to the extent that the 
real wage underhang facilitates full or over-full employment. The adjustment equations 
indicate that real wages were the major source of adjustment, and equations ID and lU 
show an inverse relationship between real wages and employment. 
A difficult result to explain, however, is the significant but negative relationship 
between Qt and employment in the labour demand function (ED). It is inconsistent with 
the apparently correct sign on Qt in equation lU and it is difficult to decide which is 
correct. The negative relationship between Qt and Ut implies, a priori, a positive 
relationship between employment and output. If Period I is characterized by significant 
degrees of labour hoarding it is conceivable that over the business cycle a negative 
relationship between employment and output may result. Perhaps a negative Qt in ID is 
not, as first thought, odd. Moreover, the coefficient on Qt in lU is only just significant at 
the 5% level of confidence; the coefficient on Qt (in lU) is not far from being positive, 
but the inconsistent signs on Qt in equations lU and ID are difficult to fathom. 
4 . 4 SUMMARY; AN0VERVI15W 
Disequilibrium economics is relatively new and the literature is in its infancy. 
Consequentiy, the interpretation of regression results is difficult. Results that at first 
glance appear to be unsatisfactory in fact suggest scenarios that were not obvious. For 
example: 
i) the interpretation of Ut in the respective labour supply equations (IS and IIS) 
allows us to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary employment; 
ii) a positive relationship between real wages and the demand for labour (i.e. a 
negative relationship between Ut and W®t) in Period II proved to be consistent 
with Patinkin's (1956,1965) disequilibrium analysis; 
iii) a negative sign on Kt in the demand for labour function (IID) in Period II, it was 
argued, may not be inconsistent with a negative Tt in the unemployment equation 
nU; and finally 
iv) an awkward negative sign on Qt in the demand for labour function in Period I, 
may well be consistent with labour hoarding in that period. 
Generally, speaking, however, the variables were internally consistent, which adds 
credence to the model. 
TABLE 4.2 
Summary of Conclusions 
Period I Period n 
- voluntary unemployment - involuntary unemployment 
- real wage underhang - real wage overhang 
- real wages major source of adjustment 
- employment major source of 
adjustment 
- no capital substitution - capital substitution; labour displacement 
- determination of real wages influenced by market conditions 
- real wages not detennined by 
labour market forces; 
essentially determined 
institutionally 
- employment unresponsive to 
output variations 
- employment more responsive 
to variations in output than in 
Period I 
- repressed inflation - Neo-Classical involuntary unemployment 
- demand factors more significant 
than non-demand factors 
- demand factors more significant 
than non-demand factors; although 
capital substitution involved in 
unemployment nexus over the long run 
- structural unemployment 
insignificant 
- structural unemployment 
insignificant 
Another interesting result of the model is that the results across the two periods 
are almost mirror images. The table below summarizes the conclusion drawn for both 
periods and except for the last two conclusions they are mirror images. I found no 
evidence of rising structural unemployment in either of the periods, and search 
unemployment was found to be unimportant in Period H. In both periods demand factors 
appeared to be the major explanation of unemployment; where Period I is characterized 
by 'Repressed Inflation', Period II was described as 'Neo-Classical Involuntary 
Unemployment'. Neither period was characterized by either pure (New)Keynesian or 
pure Neo-Classical regimes. As implied by the terms 'Neo-Classical Involuntary' and 
'Repressed Inflation', each period was a hybrid of (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical 
scenarios. Both these descriptions are consistent with the conclusions that demand 
factors (i.e. a wage-output (demand) nexus) primarily explain unemployment, but are 
opposite in that underlying 'Repressed Inflation' is a real wage underhang while a real 
wage overhang underlies 'Neo-Classical Involuntary' unemployment. 
4 .5 POLTCY IMPLICATIONS 
Classifying Period II as Neo-Classical Involuntary implies that the economy in this 
period is suffering from a real wage overhang and insufficient output. The removal of 
the overhang, however, would be not sufficient to stimulate output. This conclusion is 
derived only from a disequilibrium framework, where the equality of the actual with the 
equilibrium real wage is possible, but unemployment may still exist because of 
insufficient output (Patinkin 1956, 1965); i.e. non-clearing market equilibrium. On the 
other hand an expansion in output will not lead to a sustained decline in unemployment 
because of the real wage overhang. The real wage overhang will persist during an 
expansion in output, because the model predicts that real wages move pro-cyclically. 
With this in mind, a prerequisite to a sustained decline in unemployment is a reduction 
in real wages. To this end the current policy of the Accord is appropriate. Generally the 
policy of wage restraint advocated by the current Labor government is a step in the right 
direction. 
Output, however, needs to be stimulated in order to reduce unemployment, 
because a decline in real wages is not a sufficient condition to reduce unemployment. At 
the time of writing this thesis, it is acknowledged that Australia is facing an international 
constraint. Allowing the exchange rate to float and consequently depreciate, however, 
achieves simultaneously a stimulus to output and a reduction in real wages, assuming that 
the accord is successful in containing money wages. Assuming that the trade deficit is 
not too large in the near future, and real wages are again not too excessive, then the 
government can supplement output expansion by providing monetary/fiscal 
expansion. Under these conditions government borrowing should not place excessive 
pressure on interest rates, as taxation revenue should rise without any necessary increase 
in the marginal tax rate. When real wages are too high, any monetary/fiscal expansion 
will thwart a sustained rise in national income and employment, and hence in taxation 
revenues. Importantly, however, a reduction in the real wage is not sufficient to reduce 
involuntary unemployment, but appears to be a necessary prerequisite. 
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